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Boundary disputes pose an ongoing threat to international peace and
security across the globe. Some of these disputes involve line drawing
along a frontier,' while others involve the fate of entire towns or prov-
inces.2 Some involve little more than a small island in the middle of a
* Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law; B.A., 1994,
Princeton University; J.D., 1999, M.A., 2003, University of Michigan. For advice and com-
ments on this Article, many thanks to Judge Stephen Schwebel, Professors Lisa Eichhorn,
Mathias Reimann, Katherine Verdery, and William Zimmerman. In addition, this Article bene-
fited from the outstanding research assistance of several former students, most notably
Stefania Bondurant, Eric Montalvo, and Sarah Nielsen. Any shortcomings are the responsibil-
ity of the author alone.
1. In the 1990s, Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a bloody war over their frontier line. The
two sides ultimately agreed to submit the dispute to binding arbitration. See Decision Regard-
ing Delimitation of the Border Between the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia (Eri. v. Eth.), Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, Apr. 13, 2002,
reprinted in 41 I.L.M. 1057. The arbitration panel issued its decision in April of 2002, which
resulted in the drawing of a line that pleased neither side fully. See id. At present, Ethiopia is
threatening the stability of the region by rejecting the arbitration panel's award.
2. Although they intended to develop a peace plan for the former Yugoslavia, the par-
ticipants in the Dayton Peace Process in the mid-1990s found themselves struggling to
identify a solution to a dispute between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina over the status of
Br~ko, a town (and province) with important cultural and strategic interests for each State. See
infra note 10 (offering more information on this dispute).
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river,3 while others, like Kashmir or Jerusalem, have important historical,
cultural, and strategic value.
Despite their differences, however, boundary disputes have been
strikingly consistent in one respect: they have defied durable solutions.
Political leaders, international law jurists, and scholars have, for the most
part, failed to successfully fashion solutions for the many complex prob-
lems created by boundary disputes. Therefore, in light of this failure and
the current geopolitical landscape, the time has come to revisit a largely
abandoned theory of boundary dispute resolution: the condominium.
A condominium in international law exists when two or more States
exercise joint sovereignty over a territory.' Often used as measures of last
resort when efforts to resolve territorial disputes through negotiation
have failed, condominium arrangements have generally been designed to
be temporary in nature However, as Hersch Lauterpacht, one of the
leading twentieth-century international law scholars, noted, "[T]here is
nothing in legal theory or in the nature of sovereignty to render impossi-
ble a permanent and agreed division of sovereignty as suggested by the
very nature of a condominium. 6
Indeed, a negotiated condominium arrangement may be the ideal
model for creating a durable resolution to many boundary disputes.
Other resolution devices rely upon indivisible notions of sovereignty,
which means that, regardless of whether a dispute is resolved peacefully
or through armed conflict, one side invariably loses on a claim it be-
lieved to be valid. As past experience shows, this type of resolution is
3. For example, Botswana and Namibia disputed the ownership of Kasikili/Sedudu
Island, an uninhabited sandbar in the middle of the Chobe River, which divides the two na-
tions. Unable to reach a solution, the neighbors agreed to submit their dispute to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), which ultimately awarded the territory to Botswana. Ka-
sikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045, 1108 (Dec. 13).
4. See I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 453 (H. Lauterpacht ed.,
Longmans, Green & Co., 8th ed. 1955). A condominium arrangement for real persons, as
opposed to States, involves common ownership by two or more persons holding undivided
fractional shares in the same property and having the right to alienate their shares. Thus, in the
Anglo-American legal culture, a condominium is comparable to a tenancy in common, as
opposed to a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship. John E. Cribbet, Condominium-Home
Ownership for Megalopolis, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1215 (1963).
5. In some instances, a condominium was used as a temporary measure pending the final
adjudication of a territorial dispute. See 1 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEING
THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 370 (E. Lauterpacht ed., 1970). For example,
in the Peace Treaties of 1919, the Central Powers ceded territories to the Allied and Associated
Powers, which held those territories under joint sovereignty until final action had been taken. See
Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary arts. 53, 74, June 4,
1920, 6 L.N.T.S. 187, available at http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.phplTreaty-oLTrianon.
6. 1 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 5, at 37 1.
7. When line drawing is involved, a resolution that splits the claims of the boundary will
not give either side the full territory that it claims. In a case in which one side is awarded the full
territory, the losing party in that dispute will have lost the entire territory that it had claimed.
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often temporary, as the losing side maintains its interest in the territory
and seizes opportunities to recapture it.8
In recent years, condominium has been proposed as a solution to
several prominent boundary disputes, including Gibraltar,9 Br~ko in the
former Yugoslavia,' ° the West Bank and Gaza," the Caspian Sea, 2 the
Barents Sea, 3 and the Orange River.'4 However, with the exception of
8. See supra note I (providing a recent example of this problem).
9. This dispute is between Britain and Spain. See, e.g., Francois Raitberger, Britain
and Spain Pledge to Continue Talks on Gibraltar, REUTERS, Dec. 6, 1985.
10. When the Dayton Peace Accords were signed in December of 1995, and Yugoslavia
was officially partitioned, only one issue was explicitly left open by the parties: what to do
with the town of Br~ko and its surrounding areas. See Peter C. Farrand, Comment, Lessons
from Brdko: Necessary Components for Future Internationally Supervised Territories, 15
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 529, 531 (2001). Br~ko, a town in northern Bosnia, and its lightly popu-
lated municipality (the Brko opstina) had for centuries been a Muslim region. At the time,
Br~ko was not just another war-ravaged Bosnian town; it was the strategic linchpin for Serbia,
lying at the nexus of the east-west route linking Serb-held western Bosnia with Serbia itself.
RICHARD HOLBROOKE, To END A WAR 271 (1998). None of the delegations to the Dayton
Peace Process would concede on the status of Br~ko, and that issue alone threatened to derail
the entire Dayton Process. Farrand, supra, at 532. The creation of an arbitration panel to de-
cide the fate of Br~ko, however, led to the resolution of this issue. Id.; see Br6ko Final Award
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb.), 38 I.L.M. 534 (Arb. Trib. For Dispute over Inter-Entity Boundary in
Br~ko 1999), available at http://www.ohr.int/ohr-offices/Brko/default.aspcontent-id=5358
(last visited Mar. 20, 2008) (providing the text of that panel's decision).
11. This dispute involves Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and Jordan. See, e.g., Dore
Gold, From Polarity to Unity: World Leaders'Eyes on Us, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 10, 1995, at
8; Richard N. Haass, A Time for the U.S. to Hold Back in the Middle East, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jan. 7, 1988, at 13.
The international community has long sought to find a cooperative solution to the prob-
lem of Jerusalem. In 1947, the U.N. General Assembly requested that "[t]he city of Jerusalem
[] be established as a corpus separatum under a special international regime and [] be adminis-
tered by the United Nations." G.A. Res. 181 (H), at 146, U.N. Doc. A/181 (Nov. 29, 1947).
The resolution called on a Trusteeship Council to develop and apply a detailed Statute of the
City. Id. at 146-47. However, "[i]t has never been possible to apply the statute, as Israel and
Jordan were opposed to it." OMAR MASSALHA, TOWARDS THE LONG-PROMISED PEACE 219
(1994).
12. Until 1998, condominium was the arrangement proposed by Russia and backed by
Iran to resolve the dispute among those two nations, as well as Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and
Azerbaijan. Moscow has acquiesced in its demands, but continues to favor a condominium
arrangement for the center of the sea, which would give all five States common rights to the
sea's rich oil and fishing resources. See, e.g., Michael Bronner, Oil Economist Says Sanctions
Hurt U.S. Firms, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1997, at A8; Steve Levine, Iran Backs Russia on
Caspian Sea Claim, FIN. TIMES, May 17, 1995, at 3; Clive Schofield & Martin Pratt, Claims to
the Caspian Sea, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REV., Feb. 1, 1996, at 75; Turkmenistan Details Cas-
pian License Round, OIL & GAS J., Sept. 29, 1997, at 39.
13. This dispute is between Russia and Norway. See, e.g., David Scrivener, The Border
Dispute in the Barents Sea, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REV., June 1, 1992, at 252. As in the Cas-
pian Sea dispute, Russia was pushing for joint sovereignty over the water and its resources,
whereas Norway resisted any language in an agreement that would imply joint sovereignty
over any part of the Sea.
14. South Africa and Namibia are the parties to this dispute. See, e.g., James Lamont, S
Africa-Namibia Border Dispute Grows, FIN. TIMES, June 6, 2001, at 13.
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Br~ko, these proposals for condominium have not been taken seriously,
nor have they, for that matter, generated meaningful debate about how a
condominium could operate to solve territorial disputes.'5 Ultimately,
condominium could be the solution to the disputes over sovereignty of
Jerusalem,' 6 Kashmir, and the Caspian Sea. However, before adopting a
condominium there, international actors must first fully understand how
condominia work.
Over the past fifty years, the international community has over-
whelmingly dismissed condominium as a meaningful solution to
boundary disputes. Critics have argued-and continue to argue-that if
two or more States have not been able to reach a peaceful arrangement
for even temporary resolution of a dispute, it is hard to imagine how
those States will be able to collaborate in the day-to-day administration
of the disputed territory.'7 Even a leading international law treatise has
adopted a dismissive tone toward condominium when merely providing
an encyclopedic definition of the term:
In an age when the idea of sovereignty is uppermost, the concept
of the condominium is unlikely to attain greater importance
since, within the dogma of sovereignty, the notion of an associa-
tion of sovereignties over a single territory is incompatible with
the idea of a territory subject to a community of States. In these
terms, condominia appear as historical relics from the age of
feudal and patrimonial States or as patently inadequate anoma-
lies. However, even during the [twentieth] century, when the
dogma of sovereignty grew less rigorous, the condominium did
not establish itself as anything greater than an emergency or
temporary solution or a measure of last resort. The condominia
established after World War I testify to this point.'8 Because of
15. See Farrand, supra note 10, at 546, 548-49 (discussing the Arbitral Tribunal's deci-
sion to create a condominium in Br~ko). Perhaps it should not be surprising that condominium
has been suggested only in the most extreme cases, those in which no other solution has
proven successful. However, by proposing condominium only in such disputes, decision-
makers lose the opportunity to resolve other, perhaps smaller, disputes that might benefit from
a shared sovereignty arrangement.
16. See Hady Amr & Joel H. Samuels, Op-Ed, For Jerusalem, Shared Sovereignty,
WASH. POST, July 21, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2007/07/20/AR2007072001816.html.
17. See I LAUTERPACHT, supra note 5, at 371-72 (suggesting that a condominium
"may be practicable only between States between which there exists an atmosphere of under-
standing or co-operation-in which case solutions more simple than a condominium will be
found in the first instance").
18. The entities created after World War I were not condominia. See infra Part II.
Therefore, the experiences of those territories do not speak to the viability of condominium;
rather, they speak to the general problem of short-term solutions to delicate territorial prob-
lems.
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this, it is not now, nor has it ever been possible, to derive specific
general rules from the existence of individual condominia,
which together might make up an institute of international law.
The special character of each individual case prevents any such
attempt.
9
As is apparent from the above quotation, condominium has been
burdened historically by the primacy of sovereignty as a consideration in
the state system. Today, however, the diminished power of sovereignty as
the dominant consideration of state behavior creates more hospitable
conditions for condominium. It was not more than thirty years ago that
Hedley Bull suggested that the time "is ripe for the enunciation of new
concepts of universal political organization which [will] show how
Wales, the United Kingdom and the European Community [can] each
have some world political status while none la[y] claim to universal sov-
ereignty. 2° Today, the European Union is taken for granted-an
institution with its own legislature, its own courts, and even its own cur-
rency. The fact that European States, the paramount forces in the
creation of sovereignty in the Westphalian order, have increasingly ceded
authority to a non-state entity shows that States are reevaluating their
traditional notions of sovereignty.
The development of the European Union is but one important mani-
festation of the metamorphosis underway in international law, as States
redefine not only themselves, but also the processes by which they inter-
act with one another. The willingness of States to cede sovereignty to
other bodies suggests that condominium could, at last, serve as a viable
long-term mechanism to resolve boundary disputes. At the height of its
use from the mid-nineteenth century through the early twentieth century,
condominium failed, in large part, because States defined themselves by
their sovereignty and conceived of that sovereignty as indivisible.2
19. James Schneider, Condominium, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 732, 734 (Rudolf Bemhardt ed., 1992).
20. HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLI-
TICS 258 (2d ed. 1977). Bull also emphasized that "one reason for the vitality of the states
system is the tyranny of the concepts and normative principles associated with it ... ." Id. at
265.
21. See JONATHAN SCHELL, THE UNCONQUERABLE WORLD: POWER, NONVIOLENCE,
AND THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 292-96 (2003). As an aside, Edmund Burke was one of the
earliest international legal scholars to criticize the doctrine of sovereignty. Before the Ameri-
can Revolution, Burke warned British officials that "[a]ssertions of indivisible British
sovereignty might provoke the rebellion in the United States ...." Id. at 296. But, as Schell
later pointed out, "[there] could have been another, more flexible conception of state power
that would have permitted the American states to govern their own local affairs, while remain-
ing conjoined in a voluntary, multinational union." Id. Of course, the simple truth is that the
primacy of sovereignty as a defining characteristic of the State rendered any thoughts of
shared sovereignty all but impossible in the late eighteenth century. Also, this notion of
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However, now that sovereignty considerations have changed, condomin-
ium should be reconsidered in this new, encouraging light.
This Article attempts to revive the consideration of condominium as
a possible solution to contemporary boundary disputes. Part I describes
specific historic instances of condominia and derives relevant lessons
from each instance. Part II notes that some critics of condominium have
in fact confused condominium with other forms of joint dominion over
territory. This Part proceeds, therefore, to distinguish condominium from
these other arrangements. Next, Part III discusses how experiences with
common property regimes over common resources (such as water sup-
plies) might inform the contemporary use of condominium. Finally,
informed by lessons articulated in Parts I through III, Part IV develops a
model for a successful condominium that could be tailored to resolve a
contemporary boundary dispute.
One basic lesson of past condominium experience is that, as a quick
solution to pressing problems, condominium is not a successful solution
to territorial disputes. Therefore, condominia must be built with a long-
term vision and a strong support structure. Taken as a whole, the process
of building a condominium must be viewed like the construction of any
physical structure: the fagade of the structure has no value if the struc-
ture itself is not built on solid foundations. This Article attempts to
provide the foundation on which solutions to particular disputes can be
built.
I. THE CONDOMINIUM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The earliest condominium recorded in detail arose in the thirteenth
century B.C.22 This condominium appeared after many years of war be-
tween the empires of Egypt and Hatti.23 In 1294 B.C., the two sides
fought a particularly brutal battle at Kadesh, which led them to seek rec-
onciliation." Thereafter, Ramses II and Hattusilis III the Hittite king,
entered into a treaty that ended their hostility in Asia Minor.25 The two
sovereignty greatly influenced the failed outcome of condominia in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. See JOSHUA CASTELLINO & STEVE ALLEN, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW: A TEMPORAL ANALYSIS 8 (2003) (focusing primarily on the development
of theories of title to territory from their roots in Roman law and identifying sovereignty as a
prime consideration).
22. See GEORGE LISKA, IMPERIAL AMERICA: THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF PRI-
MACY 13-14 (1967).
23. See id. at 13.
24. See id.
25. See O.R. GURNEY, THE HITTITES 63 (1952) (noting that this treaty was signed in
the early thirteenth century B.C. (perhaps around 1258 B.C.)). Two copies of the treaty were
made, one for each ruler. See id. One of the copies was discovered on an inscription on the
[Vol. 29:727
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rulers not only renounced all projects of conquest against one another
and pledged mutual assistance in the case of attack from any third party,
but also undertook to cooperate in subduing delinquent subjects, most
26likely in Syria.
While the Egyptian-Hittite condominium was less formal than the
condominia of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it shared the dis-
tinguishing features of condominia: joint sovereignty over a territory and
legitimate rights for both sovereigns.
However, "It]he emergence of condominium as a term of interna-
tional law was largely the result of Roman and civil law influences. '27
The underpinnings of the condominium concept can be traced to the
Roman law rules of communio pro indiviso (undivided joint property).
2 8
From the Latin for joint lordship, condominium refers to a concept of
shared sovereignty and administration that reached the modem world
from the feudal system of medieval Europe. Although the institutions
may have existed in some form under Roman law, condominium was
imported into international law in the Middle Ages when Roman law
was received by the Germanic States and much of the rest of Western
Europe. It appears that the term was coined by Italian writers on civil
law, but was quickly introduced into works on international law by both
Italian and other European scholars.29
The golden age of the condominium, to the extent there was one,
lasted from the early nineteenth century through the middle of the twen-
tieth century. During the nineteenth century, condominia were employed
by European statesmen more actively than in any period before or
since.30 As a solution to border disputes and conflicting colonial claims,
and as a key tool at the Congress of Vienna after the Napoleonic wars,
wall of the Temple of Amun at Karnak, while the other, written in Akkadian, was discovered
on a tablet in Boghazkoy in modem Turkey. See id.
26. JAMES H. BREASTED, A HISTORY OF EGYPT FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE
PERSIAN CONQUEST 438 (2d ed. 1916). The precise area of the condominium and indeed the
arrangement's precise features are unknown, given the limited documentation that survives
from that era. Id. at 438-39.
27. Schneider, supra note 19, at 732.
28. ABDALLA A. EL-ERIAN, CONDOMINIUM & RELATED SITUATIONS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 50 (1952). The term condominium itself does not appear in the works of Gaius,
Justinian, or Roman jurists because the institution existed under another name. Id. See gener-
ally P. Van Warmelo, Aspects of Joint Ownership in Roman Law, 25 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR
RECHTSGESCHIEDENIS 125 (1957) (providing a deeper inquiry into Roman conceptions of co-
ownership and condominium).
29. See 2 CHARLES Du FRESNE SIEUR Du CANGE, GLOSSARIUM MEDIAE ET INFIMAE
490 (Leopold Favre ed., 1883) (discussing works on "Condominus" written in 1357 and
1476); Avv Umberto Corrado, Condominio Internazionale, 3 Nuovo DIGESTO ITALIANO 737
(1938) (describing the importation of the term "condominium" to international law).
30. See infra notes 64-101 and accompanying text (discussing condominia over Mo-
resnet and Schleswig-Holstein).
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the condominium was seen as a quick answer to maintain the nineteenth-
century European balance of power. In the twentieth century, condo-
minia became a vehicle for resolving disputes among colonial powers
over far-flung territories." At times, a functional condominium existed,
even though the two parties did not formalize the arrangement."
Condominium largely disappeared from the lexicon of international
law during the late twentieth century. Its disappearance was due primar-
ily to the fact that its basic tenets ran counter to the conception of a state
system, which is founded upon the primacy of sovereignty as the defin-
ing characteristic of States.33 Of course, international law cannot, without
admitting a condition of anarchy, contemplate a territory that is not sub-
ject to some ultimate authority capable of making final decisions. That
authority, however, need not be a single State. If two States jointly exer-
cise territorial sovereignty, the ultimate authority can be provided by
methods agreed upon by the sovereign States.
34
Two distinctions can be identified among past condominium experi-
ences. The first distinction occurs between frontier condominia (where
the disputed territory borders on all of the condominium partners) and
colonial condominia (where the disputed territory does not border on the
condominium partners). The second occurs between condominia over
land and condominia over water. These two distinctions are important in
considering the lessons that can be drawn from past experience.
31. See infra notes 42-63 and accompanying text (discussing the condominium over
the Hebrides). Another example of a frontier condominium was the condominium between
Russia and Japan over Sakhalin Island. That condominium was established in 1855 by the
Treaty of Shimoda. See ALAIN CORET, LE CONDOMINIUM 163-64 (1960). The condominium
remained in place until 1875, when, through the Treaty of Saint Petersburg, Japan ceded sov-
ereignty over Sakhalin to Russia. See id. at 164.
32. For example, from 1879 to 1908, Bosnia-Herzegovina was, at least in theory, under
the joint sovereign authority of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. Originally, Article
25 of the Final Act of the Congress of Berlin recognized that Bosnia and Herzegovina would
be "occupied and administered" by Austria-Hungary. Id. at 105. However, Austria-Hungary
entered into a later agreement with the Ottoman Empire that provided that Article 25 of the
Final Act "does not prejudice the right of sovereignty of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan over
these two provinces." Id. at 106.
33. The principal form of political organization since the seventeenth century has been
the nation-state. Since dominant powers in geopolitics generally seek supremacy rather than
compromise, they rarely treat competitors as equals. Their relationships are defined by tension
and discord, rather than by harmony and cooperation. Condominia themselves have, over
history, been the product of wars or colonial pretensions. When countries have established a
condominium, struggles over the terms of administration have impeded the governance of the
territory and have generally resulted in the dissolution of the condominium or, as in the case of
the Gulf of Fonseca, have been resolved only after protracted legal action.
34. For example, the parties may vest ultimate authority in a condominium governor
selected by them. They may also choose to create an independent arbitral or judicial body to
resolve disputes that may arise while the condominium is in place.
[Vol. 29:727
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Since the frontier condominium was devised to resolve border dis-
putes between or among contiguous States, it can be far more difficult to
manage than a colonial condominium. The nineteenth century condo-
minia over Moresnet (Germany and Belgium) and over Schleswig-
Holstein and Lauenburg (Austria and Prussia) highlight some of these
difficulties. Practical issues such as boundary crossings and currency
flow complicate the administration of frontier condominia. In addition,
issues of nationality, citizenship, and voter participation arise more often
in frontier condominia in which ethnic differences are either minimal or
nonexistent. As a result, frontier condominia have, in general, been of
shorter duration than colonial condominia.35
The colonial condominium was devised in the nineteenth century
and existed as late as 1980, the year that the last colonial condominium,the ew ebriesgaind "36
the New Hebrides, gained independence. Colonial condominia were
viewed as more permanent solutions to the colonial pretensions of the
European powers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These con-
dominia benefited from their geographical distance from the colonial
powers that administered them.37
In recent years, condominium has been proposed (and indeed
adopted) as a solution to otherwise intractable disputes over water.3 8
35. The Andorra experience is an excellent example of this point. From the Middle
Ages, the tiny territory of Andorra was a condominium, the sovereignty of which was com-
monly owned by the Bishop of Urgell in Catalonia and the Comte de Foix of southern France.
Schneider, supra note 19, at 732. After the French Revolution, Spain and France took over their
respective rights. A Concise History of Andorra, http://www.medinnus.com/andorra/history/html
(last visited Oct. 2, 2008). Since 1419, Andorra has had a representative assembly, the Council of
the Land, which provided local participation in governance of the territory. Id. However, in the
second half of the twentieth century, residents of Andorra became disenchanted with their status.
History of the Principality of Andorra, http://www.andorramania.com/histoire..gb.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 2, 2008). In 1993, after nearly two decades of agitation for independence, Andorra was
granted full independence and was admitted as a member of the United Nations. Bureau of Euro-
pean and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Background: Andorra (May 2008), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3164.htm. However, the Bishop of Urgell and the French presi-
dent are still joint presidents of Andorra. Id.
36. See John G. Peck & Robert J. Gregory, A Brief Overview of Old New Hebrides, 7
ANTHROPOLOGIST 269, 269 (2005). An additional example of a colonial condominium ar-
rangement is the joint administration of the Canton and Enderbury Islands by the United
Kingdom and the United States. See Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement Regarding
the Administration of the Islands of Canton and Enderbury, U.S.-Gr. Brit.-N. Ir., Apr. 6, 1939,
196 L.N.T.S. 343, available at http://untreaty.un.org/unts/60001-120000/19/29/00037415.pdf
[hereinafter Islands of Canton and Enderbury Agreement]. The Canton and Enderbury Islands,
important links for aviation routes in the Pacific, were held in condominium from 1939 to
1979.
37. By the twentieth century, the United States also had become involved in colonial
acquisition, and so it too became a party to colonial condominia. See generally M. Moye, La
question des iles Samoa, 6 REvuE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 125 (1899).
38. See, e.g., Kamyar Mehdiyoun, Ownership of Oil and Gas Resources in the Caspian
Sea, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 179, 179-89 (2000) (noting arguments made in favor of a
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Condominia over water present less delicate demands for joint coopera-
tion than most condominia over land because, in the former instance,
States are generally concerned only with rights and access to natural re-
sources. Part L.A will review the successes and failures of past
condominia and will, from those successes and failures, draw lessons
relevant to the development of a contemporary condominium model. Part
I.B will turn to two water condominia to consider the lessons those ex-
periences offer for crafting a model for future condominia over land.39
For a State to claim a condominium in a territory with another State
(or States), each side must admit that the territory belongs to it con-
jointly with the other State (or States). Whether or not a right is
sovereign is a question of more than academic interest. States and their
courts must also confront the range of legal issues that arise from inter-
preting a condominium agreement. For example, in the early twentieth
century, French courts struggled to define, at least on a consistent basis,
the status of the residents of Andorra, a territory jointly governed by
France and Spain.4° One court held that Andorrans should be treated as
foreigners, while another stated that the "rights of sovereignty which
France exercises in Andorra d[id] not permit of the territory being con-
sidered as foreign.'
condominium over the Caspian Sea); Benjamin K. Sibbett, Note, Tokdo or Takeshima? The
Territorial Dispute Between Japan and the Republic of Korea, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1606
(1997-98) (discussing the dispute between Japan and Korea over the Liancourt Rocks in the
Sea of Japan). For an in-depth discussion of active maritime disputes in the 1990s, see Jona-
than I. Charney, Progress in International Maritime Boundary Delimitation Law, 88 AM. J.
INT'L L. 227 (1994).
39. See infra Part II.B.
40. See ANNUAL DIGEST & REPORTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES: YEARS 1993 &
1994 56 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 1940). Although today Andorra is an independent nation with a
parliamentary democracy, it was governed for more than 700 years (1278 to 1993) as a co-
principality by Spain and France.
41. Id. Note that, although Andorra is an example of joint administration (which led to
the French court's consideration of citizenship and related issues), it is not an example of a
condominium per se. The power of administration was not shared by two States; rather, it was
held by the leader of a State (France) and an individual (the Bishop of Urgell in Spain).
Dietrich Schindler, Andorra, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
19, at 164, 164. The Valleys of Andorra had been held in joint sovereignty since 1278, when
the French counts of Foix and the Spanish Bishop of Urgell were given joint and equal rights
as the outcome of a special arbitration known as a pardage. Id. (noting also that under the
terms of the 1278 pargage, the vassals paid an annual tribute to the co-suzerains, who, in turn,
nominated a representative (viguier) to represent them in the Valleys). In 1589, the French
rights passed from the counts of Foix to the King of France and, following the French Revolu-
tion, to the French State. Id. The rights of the Bishop of Urgell have never been passed to
Spain. Id. Therefore, the State of France and the Bishop of Urgell maintain an ongoing interest
in the sovereign relations of Andorra. Id. Indeed, Articles 43 and 44 of the Constitution of
Andorra, which was adopted in 1993, recognize that
[i]n accordance with the institutional tradition of Andorra, the Coprinceps are,
jointly and indivisibly, the Cap de l'Estat [sic], and they assume its highest repre-
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As shown by the Andorran example, a successful condominium must
address more than just the underlying issues of shared sovereignty. A
roadmap for a condominium must address citizenship, voting rights, ex-
ecutive, legislative, and judicial powers, economic and financial issues,
public services, foreign affairs, defense, freedom of movement, and a
variety of other considerations.
A. The Experience of Condominium over Land
New Hebrides: Colonial Condominium. The best example of a colo-
nial condominium is the condominium agreement that governed the New
Hebrides, a chain of islands located in the Pacific Ocean. The New Heb-
rides were officially discovered by the Spanish explorer Pedro Fernandes
de Quiros in 16062.4 By the late nineteenth century, both France and
Great Britain maintained an active presence on the islands. 43 Three cen-
turies after de Quiros discovered the islands, by the Convention of
October 20, 1906, the United Kingdom and France established a condo-
minium to administer the New Hebrides. 44 The islands were governed as
45a condominium for seventy-four years.
sentation. The Coprinceps, an institution which dates from the Parratges and their
historical evolution, are in their personal and exclusive right, the Bishop of Urgell
and the President of the French Republic. Their powers are equal and derive from
the present Constitution .... The Coprfnceps are the symbol and guarantee of the
permanence and continuity of Andorra as well as of its independence and the main-
tenance of the spirit of parity in the traditional balanced relation with the
neighboring States. They proclaim the consent of the Andorran State to honor its in-
ternational obligations in accordance with the Constitution. The Coprinceps
arbitrate and moderate the functioning of the public authorities and of the institu-
tions, and are regularly informed of the affairs of the State by their own initiative, or
that of the Sfndic General or the Cap de Govern [sic].
Constitution of the Principality of Andorra arts. 43, 44, available at http:/l
www.andorramania.com/constit-gb.htm.
42. See 22 HISTORICAL SECTION, GR. BRIT. COLONIAL OFFICE, HANDBOOKS PREPARED
UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE, No. 147 7
(1920) [hereinafter HANDBOOKS, No. 147].
43. See Daniel P. O'Connell, The Condominium of the New Hebrides, 43 BRIT. YB.
INT'L L. 71, 74-75 (1968-69). Among other things, in 1887, the two sides agreed to a conven-
tion that established a joint naval commission. Steven Less, New Hebrides, in III
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 19, at 573, 574. The Commission
was staffed by French and British naval officers, who were to maintain order and protect the
lives and property of French and British citizens in the New Hebrides. Id. at 575. This Con-
vention, however, did not create a condominium over the islands because it merely created a
structure to protect national interests in a terra nullius. O'Connell, supra, at 75. Even after the
1887 Convention was signed, no foreign power was precluded from later taking possession of
the islands. Id.
44. See O'Connell, supra note 43, at 75-76.
45. See Less, supra note 43, at 575. Since it was granted its independence in 1980, the
country has changed its name to Vanuatu. Id.
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The principles of the condominium were laid out in the General In-
structions to the British and French High Commissioners of August 29,
1907. The Instructions detail the essence of a joint sovereignty agree-
ment:
The desire of the two Governments is to secure the exercise of
their paramount rights in the New Hebrides. The two Powers,
who were mutually bound not to intervene separately in the New
Hebrides, now agree to intervene there together. Instead of re-
maining mutually exclusive, their paramount rights are
combined; the two countries jointly assume jurisdiction in the is-
lands, and thereby provide against the possible appearance of a
third Power.46
In administering the condominium over the New Hebrides, each
government had sovereignty over its own nationals, while the two con-
dominium powers governed the indigenous population jointly.47 Essential
government services such as tax collection, communications, public
health, and public works were provided jointly, and the costs were paid
from local revenues and joint contributions. 8 A Joint Court ran the
criminal and civil justice systems. 49 The Court consisted of one British
judge, one French judge, and a neutral third member.0 Both languages
and currencies were official."
Each of the two condominium powers was responsible for all of the
expenses of its own administration. 2 A unified condominium fund,
drawn from equal contributions by both States (as well as from local
revenues), covered the costs of joint services." All tax revenues went
directly in the coffers of the joint condominium fund.4
The executive command of the condominium consisted of a British
Resident Commissioner and a French Resident Commissioner, who
46. General Instructions to the British High Commissioner with Regard to the Applica-
tion of the Convention of October 20, 1906, reprinted in 100 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE
PAPERS: 1906-1907 519 (Richard W. Brant & Willoughby Maycock eds., 1911).
47. See HANDBOOKS, No. 147, supra note 42, at 16. See generally HUBERT BENOIST, LE
CONDOMINIUM DES NOUVELLES-HEBRIDES ET LA SOCIETE MELANESIENNE (A. Pedone ed.,
1972); CORET, supra note 31; N. POLITIS, LE CONDOMINIUM FRANCO-ANGLAIS DES NOUVEL-
LEs-HEBRIDES (A. Pedone ed., 1908).
48. HANDBOOKS, No. 147, supra note 42, at 16.
49. See id. at 18-21.
50. Id. at 18.
51. Peck & Gregory, supra note 36, at 280.
52. Protocol Respecting the New Hebrides Signed at London, August 6, 1914, by Rep-






acted in concert on all major decisions.55 Any decision affecting the ad-
ministration of the condominium was to be reached by the executive
command.56 Officers of both nationalities staffed the administrative de-
partments, and actions by the departments were subject to review by the
Resident Commissioners acting jointly. 7 Condominium agents of both
nationalities were deployed on various islands in the chain and were
granted joint control over their regions."
From as early as 1906, the police force in the New Hebrides was di-
vided into two separate forces of armed native officers, one British, the
other French.5 9 The two forces reported to two National Commandants,
each of whom served under his respective Resident Commissioner.
6
0
Each force was responsible for policing the actions of its own nationals.6,
The cost of the maintenance of each police force was covered by its own
national government, except when the forces acted jointly, in which case,
expenses were paid from condominium funds.
Notable both for its longevity and for its effectiveness in incorporat-
ing local traditions, the New Hebrides condominium provides several
63important lessons regarding colonial condominia. First, a more distant
55. Peck & Gregory, supra note 36, at 280.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 281.
59. O'Connell, supra note 43, at 105.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 106.
62. See id.
63. By contrast, certain colonial condominia offer no real guidance for future condo-
minia because the colonial powers were not interested in governing the territory. For example,
in 1939, the United States and Great Britain created a condominium over the Canton and En-
derbury Islands in the South Pacific. See Islands of Canton and Enderbury Agreement, supra
note 36. The United States had claimed title over the islands based on the Guano Act of 1856,
while Great Britain had incorporated them into the Phoenix Island Group after asserting that
the islands were terra nullius and, therefore, fair game for conquest. EL-ERIAN, supra note 28,
at 105. These two tiny atolls were only of interest to the United States as possible landing
strips for commercial and military flights. Editorial Comments, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 519, 526
(1939). Great Britain was interested primarily in the phosphate resources offered by the is-
lands. See id. at 525. In 1939, the two States agreed to create a fifty-year condominium over
the islands. See Islands of Canton and Enderbury Agreement, supra note 36. The agreement
provided:
I. The Government of the United States and the Government of the United
Kingdom, without prejudice to their respective claims to the Canton and Enderbury
Islands, agree to a joint control over these islands.
II. The Islands shall, during the period of joint control, be administered by a
United States and a British official appointed by their respective Governments.
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form of administration helps to maintain a sense of order because it al-
lows the local citizens to exercise a greater form of self-governance.
Second, joint implementation of laws and tax codes solidifies the rela-
tionship with the ruling sovereign powers. Third, when States have a
shared interest in the administration of the territory and maintain an ac-
tive presence in the territory, the equipoise in the relationship between
the sovereign powers can be preserved.
Moresnet: Frontier Condominium. Due to ambiguities in the provi-
sions of an 1816 border treaty between the Netherlands and Prussia,
Moresnet, a region that lies just a few kilometers from the spot where the
borders of Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands meet, was held in
condominium from 1816 until 1919, the year Belgium was granted full
sovereignty over the territory. 4 The condominium became necessary be-
cause, in defining the frontier between Prussia and the Netherlands, the
1815 Act of the Congress of Vienna omitted the District of Moresnet
VI. An airport may be constructed and operated on Canton Island by an American
company or companies, satisfactory to the United States Government, which, in re-
turn for an agreed fee, shall provide facilities for British aircraft ....
VII. The joint control ... shall have a duration of fifty years from this day's date. If
no agreement to the contrary is reached before the expiration of that period the joint
control shall continue thereafter until such time as it may be modified or terminated
by mutual consent of the two Governments.
Id. §§ I-Il, VI-VII.
Today, the islands form part of the independent nation of Kiribati. The experience of
these islands demonstrates that the underlying agreement that creates the condominium can
also delineate particular rights and powers in favor of one sovereign power. In other words, as
Section VI of the Agreement demonstrates, sovereignty can be divided and partitioned by one
State in favor of another.
64. Schneider, supra note 19, at 733. The status of Moresnet was discussed by Bel-
gium's main court of last resort in the case of Kepp et consorts. EL-ERIAN, supra note 28, at
94 (citing Kepp et consorts, Cour de Cassation [Ct. of Cassation], May 25, 1925, Pasicrisie
Belge 1925, pt. I, 253-55). On September 16, 1924, the Belgian Court of Compensation for
War Damages at Verviers denied claims against Belgium for damages inflicted during World
War I on property located in the Commune of La Calamine (the territory formerly known as
Moresnet). Id. The court of last resort reversed the decision, finding that the territory was
Belgian at the time of the attack. Id. It further held that Belgian sovereignty did not begin with
the Treaty of Versailles, when Germany officially recognized Belgian unilateral sovereignty
over the territory, but rather with the Treaty of Vienna in 1815. Id. It stated that the Treaty of
Versailles simply removed the obstacle of joint sovereignty by rescinding Germany's rights
over the territory; however, no new rights of sovereignty were provided by Belgium's acquisi-
tion of unilateral sovereignty, even though additional powers might be drawn from the new
arrangement (such as the right to police the territory). Id. Thus, the Belgian court concluded
that Moresnet must be considered "as having been a part of the Netherlands since 1815 and of
Belgium since 1830." Id. (citation omitted).
65. See Vienna Congress Treaty, June 9, 1815, reprinted in 1 E. HERTSLET, MAP OF
EUROPE BY 'I'REATY 208 (1875); see also Chronique Des Faits Internationaux, 11 REvuE
GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIc 68, 71 (1904).
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Article 25 provided that "His Majesty the King of Prussia shall also pos-
sess in full property and sovereignty, the countries on the left bank of the
Rhine included in the frontier."66 The District of Moresnet, however, was
not contemplated in the language of Article 25.67 Prussia and the Nether-
lands could not come to an agreement on the interpretation of the
boundary provision, and both claimed Moresnet.
Despite their disagreement, however, Prussia and the Netherlands
agreed to create a condominium over the territory.68 Under the terms of
the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, the village of Moresnet itself became
Dutch, Neu-Moresnet became part of Prussia, and the zinc mine and the
village of Kelmis (La Calamine) around the mine became a condomin-
ium, with both States exercising joint administration over the area.69 In
1830, when Belgium gained its independence from the Netherlands, the
land on the Dutch side came under Belgian control, and Belgium took
over the position of co-administrator. 0
The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle also set forth the rules for governing
the condominium.7' According to its terms, legislative and executive
powers were to be exercised in common by the governments of Prussia
and the Netherlands/Belgium. 72 However, the French Codes of the First
Empire, which were the law of Moresnet in 1815, were to remain in
force and could not be amended or replaced without agreement by both
governments. 3 At first, the territory was governed by two royal commis-
sioners, one from each sovereign, but later, Moresnet was granted a
greater measure of self-administration when a mayor and municipal
66. Vienna Congress Treaty, supra note 65, at 229.
67. See id. at 229-31.
68. See Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, Prussia-Neth., June 26, 1816, reprinted in part in
CORET, supra note 31, at 148 (full treaty on file with author). The reason that the two sides
refused to concede to one another was simple: in between the villages of Moresnet and Neu-
Moresnet lay a small swatch of territory that included a valuable zinc mine. Both countries
were intent on maintaining their rights to this resource.
69. See id. Article XXXI explicitly provided for the conditions concerning exploitation
of the resources at the mine (La Calamine), thereby binding both parties in their oversight of
the zinc mining operations. Id. art. XXXI.
70. See Chronique Des Faits Internationaux, supra note 65, at 72.
71. Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, supra note 68. While the treaty included many broad
provisions on governance, it also included several strikingly specific provisions, recognizing
the need for particularly close attention to detail necessary for successful governance of a
condominium. So, for example, Articles IX and XIII provide detailed instructions for con-
struction and passage in the event that either the Government of Prussia or the City of
Malmedy decides to complete construction of a planned mountain road that would wind
across borders drawn elsewhere in the Treaty. Id. arts. IX, XIII, XV, XVI. Furthermore, Article
XII specifically allowed Prussian citizens to purchase wood and certain other goods from the
condominium territory and to remove those goods without being taxed. Id. art. XII.
72. Id. art. XXVII.
73. See CORET, supra note 31, at 148.
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council were installed] 4 The mayor (also the head of State), however,
75was appointed by the two commissioners.
Even though the zinc mine attracted many workers from the
neighboring countries, few issues of citizenship arose as a result of the
condominium. Virtually all of the workers who came to Moresnet were
either Prussian or Belgian. 6 In fact, during the condominium, these out-
side workers made up the majority of Moresnet's population.7 The
workers who came to Moresnet maintained their original citizenship and
were subject to the criminal laws of the country of their citizenship.78
Also, since fewer than 500 original residents of Moresnet remained
there during the condominium period, issues of citizenship over original
inhabitants were minimal.79 These residents were joint citizens, and,
unlike their neighbors who were Belgian or Prussian nationals, they were
not subject to military service in either State. ° Each member of the na-
tive, "neutral" population, as it was known, could choose his country of
allegiance for purposes of determining the body of laws that would apply
to him.8"
Police commissioners from both States acted in concert in perform-
ing their duties in the territory.82 Their duties were complicated by
provisions that restricted their ability to act unilaterally in the territory.83
In addition, an agreement, which was reached between the condominium
powers in 1853, enabled the two commissioners to ask for the police
force of their respective States as necessary.84
As a condominium territory, Moresnet offered several benefits to its
residents, including low taxes, the absence of import-tariffs from both
sovereign powers, and lower prices compared to the prices for similar
goods just across the border.85 Most services (such as mail) were shared
between Belgium and Prussia.8 6 Also, residents who were litigants in a
74. See id. at 292.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 73-75.
77. See Chronique des Faits Internationaux, supra note 65, at 78.
78. Id.
79. Id.; see also CORET, supra note 3 1, at 149.
80. Camille Piccioni, Moresnet, in 2 DICTIONNAIRE DIPLOMATIQUE 165, 165 (M.A.-F.
Frangulis ed., 1993).
81. See Chronique Des Faits Internationaux, supra note 65, at 75-77.
82. See CORET, supra note 31, at 293.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 293.
85. See Chronique des Faits Internationaux, supra note 65, at 76-77; see also Treaty of
Aix-La-Chappelle, supra note 68, art. XII.
86. See, CORET supra note 31, at 149.
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civil judicial action could select the venue for the trial, either the Belgian
Tribunal of Verviers or the Prussian Tribunal at Aix-la-Chappelle.87
Although the value of the territory shifted in the eyes of its sovereign
powers after the zinc resources of the Moresnet mine had been ex-
hausted, their interest in the territory did not disappear altogether.
Neither Belgium nor Prussia ever surrendered its original claim to the
territory, and, around 1900, Prussia began to take a more aggressive
stance toward the territory.88 At one point, Prussia was accused of ob-
structing the administrative process in order to force the issue.89
In addition to Prussia's efforts, other countries attempted to disrupt
the condominium in Moresnet. In 1914, during World War I, Germany
invaded Belgium. Later, in 1915, the Germans annexed Moresnet. Bel-
gium disputed the annexation, however, and was vindicated in 1919 with
the Treaty of Versailles, which gave Moresnet to Belgium.9° Aside from a
brief period during World War II, when Germany re-annexed the terri-
tory, Moresnet has remained part of Belgium since 1919.9'
Many lessons can be derived from the Moresnet condominium ex-
perience. First, the condominium shows that contiguous States can
exercise joint sovereignty over a territory with which they share a com-
mon border. This lesson alone stands in stark contrast to the claim that
condominium cannot succeed. Second, the citizenship rules of the Mo-
resnet condominium provide useful guidance for any future
condominium. Third, the experience illustrates how choice of venue pro-
visions, standards for the application of criminal law, and reliance on the
legal code in place at the time of the creation of the condominium can
help to create transparency and sustain the condominium.
Schleswig-Holstein: Frontier/Colonial Condominium. The nine-
teenth century Prussian province of Schleswig-Holstein was made up of
the duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg. For several centu-
ries, the three duchies, which lie on a peninsula between Denmark and
Germany, were disputed. 92 In spite of the competing claims to the territo-
ries, Denmark unilaterally ruled the three duchies until its defeat in 1864
at the hands of Austria and Prussia.93 In accordance with the Treaty of
87. See id. at 84.
88. See Chronique Des Faits Internationaux, supra note 65, at 76-77.
89. See id.
90. Treaty of Peace with Germany [Treaty of Versailles] art. 27, June 28, 1919, 2
Bevans 43, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/parti.asp.
91. The territory is now part of the municipality of Kelmis/La Calamine in the Belgian
East Cantons.
92. See generally 6 HISTORICAL SECTION, GR. BRIT. COLONIAL OFFICE, HANDBOOKS
PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE, No.
35, at 10-73 (1920) [hereinafter HANDBOOKS, No. 35].
93. See generally id.
Summer 20081
Michigan Journal of International Law
Vienna, Denmark renounced all rights in the duchies in favor of Prussia
and Austria.94
In 1865, Prussia and Austria entered into an agreement to organize a
condominium over the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein.95 The exercise
of rights over the two duchies was divided to establish a condominium.96
This condominium, however, took a different form from the Moresnet
condominium. In the case of Schleswig and Holstein, the governments
of Prussia and Austria agreed that, although the two duchies would re-
main in joint sovereignty, each territory would be administered
independently. Thus, Austria administered Holstein, and Prussia admin-
istered Schleswig.97 Following the war between Austria and Prussia in
1866, Austria transferred to Prussia all of her rights over the Duchies of
Schleswig-Holstein.98
The unilateral administration of the two condominium territories re-
flects an alternative method of resolving border disputes. Although each
State administered only one of the two condominium territories, both
maintained sovereignty over the whole of the condominium, limiting the
ability of either State to breach the spirit of the agreement. In Schleswig,
all inhabitants were citizens of Prussia and subject to the laws of Prus-
sia.99 In Holstein, the residents were citizens of Austria and subject to the
laws of Austria.O0 Prussia and Austria conferred only on the rare occa-
sions when problems of administration arose.101
Because each State had functional autonomy over the activities in its
respective territory, the Schleswig-Holstein model presented unique
monitoring difficulties and, therefore, could only succeed between States
that trusted one another. The Austro-Prussian condominium over
Schleswig-Holstein demonstrates an additional element, which, though
not essential, can assist in the maintenance of a condominium: shared
94. See Treaty of Vienna, Austria-Den.-Prussia, art. III, Oct. 30, 1864, reprinted in
HANDBOOKS, No. 35, supra note 92, at 102. Article III of the Treaty provided, "His Majesty
the King of Denmark renounces all his rights over the Duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and
Lauenburg in favor of their Majesties the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria, engag-
ing to recognize the dispositions which their said Majesties shall make with reference to those
Duchies." Id.
95. Convention of Gastein, Austria-Prussia, art. I, Aug. 14, 1865, reprinted in HAND-
BOOKS, No. 35, supra note 92, at 105 [hereinafter Convention of Gastein]. The duchy of
Lauenburg was ceded to Prussia as sole sovereign. Convention of Gastein, supra, art. VIII.
The administered territories can be considered a hybrid frontier/colonial condominium, since
they bordered Prussia, but not Austria.
96. Id. art. I.
97. Id.
98. Treaty of Prague, Austria-Prussia, art. V, Aug. 23, 1866, reprinted in HANDBOOKS,
No. 35, supra note 92, at 105.





ideology. In the mid-nineteenth century, Austria and Prussia shared a
conservative ideology, exemplified by Prince Klemens von Metternich,
which included faith in the monarchical principle and the existing order
in Europe. This shared ideology helped the two sides to overcome new
political movements in the condominium territories. The success of the
condominium, though, was not pinned to the agreement of the sovereign
powers on day-to-day administration.
Samoa: Colonial Governance. The case of the tripartite rule of the
Samoan Islands from 1889 to 1899 has been referred to as a case of co-
lonial condominium. 2 As with the New Hebrides, the interests involved
were colonial, rather than frontier. At the same time, the joint rule of
Germany, Great Britain, and the United States over Samoa took the form
of a joint protectorate more than that of a condominium. ' 3 Whereas a
condominium would have vested all three powers with sovereignty over
Samoa, the agreement governing the joint administration of Samoa actu-
ally stripped all three States of sovereign powers: each power held equal
authority in the governance of Samoa, but that authority was less than
sovereign authority. ' 4 All three countries had an interest in using Samoa
for shipping and military purposes. 0 5 Therefore, at the outset, the parties
sought a long-term solution to their overlapping claims.'°6
In 1879, Germany concluded a treaty with the Samoan king that
granted Germany a dominant influence over the islands.' 7 Meanwhile,
the United States and Great Britain retained their interest in the territory.
Tension among the three powers in Samoa had developed early in the
nineteenth century, as commercial interests collided.' 8 Otto von Bis-
marck invited representatives of the United States and Great Britain to
102. See Lise Namikas, Samoa and US Empire, 10 PEACE REV. 375, 380 (1998). Nami-
kas states,
Historians have generally taken [the position] that all three powers were to have an
equal say in Samoa, and have depicted the post-1889 government of Samoa as a tri-
partite rule, condominium, and tridominium, further implying no difference from
Bayard's 1887 plan. These labels, however, do no accurately describe the govern-
ment set up after the Berlin Conference.
Id.
103. See infra Part II.B (providing a discussion of the distinction between condominia
and mandates or protectorates).
104. See Moye, supra note 37, at 133-36.
105. See 22 HISTORICAL SECTION, GR. BRIT. COLONIAL OFFICE, HANDBOOKS PREPARED
UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE, No. 146, at 21
(1920) [hereinafter HANDBOOKS, No. 146].
106. See Moye, supra note 37, at 135.
107. Id. at 129-30.
108. Id. at 135-37.
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Berlin, and the three sides drew up the Samoa Act of June 14, 1889.'09
The Act stipulated that (1) the islands would remain independent and
neutral, (2) the citizens and subjects of the three States would have equal
rights on the islands, and (3) none of the States would exercise any sepa-
rate control over the islands or their government."
0
The Act entered into by the States created an arbitral tribunal that
heard all disputes involving territorial governance and administration.'
Any of the three governing States could bring an issue to the arbitral tri-
bunal, which was composed of representatives of all three States."2 A
simple majority vote determined the outcome of the dispute."'
The tri-partite arrangement lasted for ten years, until the three sides
were unable to mediate tribal feuds over succession."' The joint power-
sharing arrangement was disbanded and, by the Anglo-German Conven-
tion of 1899 and the Tripartite Convention of December 2, 1899, the
United States was vested with control over the islands.
' 5
The Samoan experience provides one important clue for condominia
where more than two States govern the territory. When two States con-
trol a condominium, the power to make a final decision can be handed
over to an arbitral or judicial authority. However, when there are more
than two States, the power of a decision can be vested in a majority of
them, so long as the States involved wield equal power in the governance
arrangement.'16
Samoa is also an example of a false condominium-a territory la-
beled a condominium, but not governed as one. Since the arrangement
over Samoa did not vest any of the three administering States with sov-
ereignty, this conclusion misses the point. The Samoan administration
acted without authority and without representing the interests of any of
the three States that, in principle, jointly controlled Samoa. This admin-
istrative structure guaranteed a short-lived tenure of joint control. Thus,
109. See HANDBOOKS, No. 146, supra note 105, at 21-22; see Final Act of the Confer-
ence on the Affairs of Samoa, Gr. Brit.-F.R.G.-U.S., June 14, 1889, 81 B.S.P. 1058 (1889)
[hereinafter Conference on the Affairs of Samoa] (containing the text of the Samoa Act).
110. Conference on the Affairs of Samoa, supra note 109, art. I.
111. Id. art. IV. The three powers defined this mandate broadly, meaning that many non-
administrative issues were taken to the tribunal for adjudication.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. HANDBOOKS, No. 146, supra note 105, at 22.
115. See generally J.B. HENDERSON, JR., AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS 205-89
(1901).
116. Despite its advantages for swift and efficient decision-making, this procedural de-
vice can prove divisive, particularly in a situation where a single neutral party is left to cast the
deciding vote on each issue. Thus, even in a condominium of multiple powers, an independent
entity should be selected to resolve all disputes that may arise in the administration of the
condominium. See I OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, at 243.
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while the Samoan case presents a strong condemnation of trusteeship
governance, many of the difficulties of the Samoan experience relate
directly to the uncertainty regarding sovereignty and authority for gov-
erning the territory."
7
Trieste: Hybrid Condominium. Some condominia do not conform
strictly to the frontier-colonial divide. Perhaps the best-known condo-
minium was the arrangement to govern Trieste after World War I."8 The
Free Territory of Trieste was created by the Italian Peace Treaty in the
aftermath of World War II. Trieste was to be governed as a condominium
with the international community having joint sovereignty over it.
After World War II, Trieste and its environs were claimed by Yugo-
slavia, mainly because the population surrounding the city of Trieste was
predominantly Slovenian (even though the population of the city of Tri-
este itself was largely Italian)." 9 The Western powers opposed the
Yugoslav claim.2 0 Ultimately, Yugoslavia capitulated, and the Allied
powers drafted a treaty, the Italian Peace Treaty, which established a new
State, the Free Territory of Trieste.1
2'
The Italian Peace Treaty provided that, pending the assumption of
power by a Governor for Trieste, the Free Territory would be adminis-
tered by the "Allied military commands within their respective zones.' 22
The northern part of the territory (Zone A), which included the city of
117. See infra Part II.B.2 (offering a more complete discussion of trusteeship agree-
ments).
118. Treaty of Peace with Italy, Feb. 10, 1947,61 Stat. 1245, 49 U.N.T.S. 3.
119. GEOFFREY Cox, THE RACE FOR TRIESTE 254-55 (1977).
120. Id. at 226. For two months in the spring of 1947, the Allied forces squared off
against the Yugoslav army. See id. at 247-57. As Cox observed, Trieste was "the last battle-
ground in the Mediterranean of World War II, and the first battleground of the Cold War." Id.
at 256-57.
121. Id. at 256-63. The primary precedent in international law for the Trieste arrange-
ment was the treatment of Danzig after World War I. The Treaty of Versailles created the Free
City of Danzig as a separate State. See Treaty of Versailles, supra note 90, arts. 100-08. Dan-
zig was "placed under the protection of the League of Nations," which was represented in
Danzig by a High Commissioner. Id. arts. 102-03. The Constitution of Danzig, establishing
the political organization of the Free State, was protected by the League as well. Id. art. 103.
Trieste and Danzig must be distinguished from Tangier, which was the hybrid protector-
ate established in 1923 and modified in 1928 and 1945. The critical difference between
Tangier and the other two international arrangements concerns the outstanding claims on the
territories. Whereas in the latter cases sovereignty was in abeyance, in the case of Tangier, the
Sultan of Morocco never renounced his sovereign rights in Tangier. Otto Steiner, Tangier, in
IV ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 19, at 760, 761. Indeed, the
Convention Regarding the Organization of the Statute of the Tangier Zone expressly recog-
nized the "sovereign rights of His Majesty the Sultan." Convention Regarding the
Organization of the Statute of the Tangier Zone art. 25, Dec. 18, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 542.
122. ECON. COOPERATION ADMIN., EUROPEAN RECOVERY PROGRAM: TRIESTE COUNTRY
STUDY 12 (1949). The Free Territory included the city of Trieste and the coastal zone of Istria,
running from Duino along the Gulf of Trieste to Cittanova. See BOGDAN C. NOVAK, TRIESTE
1941-1954: THE ETHNIC, POLITICAL, AND IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE 246 (1970).
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Trieste, was under joint British-American administration, whereas the
southern zone (Zone B) was under Yugoslav administration.2 The Treaty
presumed full cooperation between all powers involved, particularly be-
tween Yugoslavia and Italy.'" The U.N. Security Council guaranteed the
independence and territorial integrity of Trieste.12
As soon as the Treaty went into force, however, the Yugoslavs im-
mediately incorporated their portion of the Free Territory into
Yugoslavia. 26 In response to the actions taken by Yugoslavia, on March
20, 1948, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom formally
recommended that the Treaty be revised to return the Free Territory to
Italy. 27 Pending revision of the Treaty, the Free Territory continued to be
administered in two parts, one incorporated into the body of Yugoslavia,
the other administered jointly by the Allied Command of the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Italy (the Allied Command).' 2' Thus,
the relevant condominium experience in Trieste occurred not over the
whole territory, but rather over the Italian portion of the Free Territory
(Zone A) during the period before the whole territory was returned to
Italy.
129
Zone A was divided into three hierarchical levels of local administra-
tion: the zone, the province, and the commune. 13 Authorities at each
level oversaw "the departments of public health, public utilities, agricul-
ture and fisheries, and civil transport.' 3' Even though three layers of
authority existed, the guiding principle in this structure was that only
local (commune) authorities could regulate certain sectors of the terri-
123. See Cox, supra note 119, at 256.
124. ECON. COOPERATION ADMIN., supra note 122, at 12. Ultimately, the signatories
hoped to create the institutions that would allow Trieste to become free and independent over
time. NOVAK, supra note 122, at 270.
125. Cox, supra note 119, at 263.
126. ECON. COOPERATION ADMIN., supra note 122, at 12.
127. See id. at 12-13.
128. See DONATO MARTUCCI, TRIESTE is No JOKING MATTER: AN ITALIAN VIEWPOINT
(1953).
129. Indeed, in some ways, Trieste is another example of an historical misnomer-a
territory described as a condominium, but not governed under the basic principles of joint
sovereignty inherent in condominia. It is worth noting that the Zone A condominium was
created among parties that essentially held the same interests at heart and, as in the case of
Sudan, one party (Italy) held sway over the other condominium participant (an Anglo-
American coalition on behalf of the Allied Powers). See infra notes 152-156 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Sudanese case). Unlike Sudan, though, where the relationship was
defined by England's disproportionate power over Egypt, the imbalance in Zone A was more
the result of Italy's closer attachment to, and interest in, the governance of Trieste relative to
that of the Anglo-American coalition.




tory." As in the New Hebrides, this arrangement proved successful not
only as a management device, but also in creating a sense of local own-
ership over the governance process.
With its independence and territorial integrity guaranteed, the Free
Territory did not have any military or paramilitary units, only a police
force.' The Allied Command controlled all military actions within Zone
A, leaving no opportunities for the opposition forces within and around
the Zone to mount an armed resistance.'34 The police force was com-
posed of Zone A residents of both Italian and Slovenian ethnicity.
135
With regard to the economy of Trieste, in accordance with the Italian
Peace Treaty, a general financial agreement was reached on March 9,
1948, between the Allied Military Government and the Italian Govern-
ment (the Financial Agreement).'36 Under the Financial Agreement, Italy
agreed to provide the basic internal currency requirements of Zone A.'37
In addition, Trieste was included in the Italian customs regime and its
foreign exchange zone. 13 In return, Italy supplied foreign exchange to
Trieste. 39 Many of the staple goods, such as food, fuel, and medical sup-
plies, were supplied to Trieste by the United States. 140 Domestic
production was limited, and Zone A relied on external assistance to
maintain its economy. 4' The Financial Agreement reinforced Italian
132. Id. at 291. The command structure of the territory reflected the intricacies of gov-
ernance by multiple authorities. The Allied Command appointed a zone president, who headed
the zone administration. Id. The president was assisted by a vice-president, who was also
selected by the Allied Command, and by a zone administrative board composed of nine mem-
bers. Id. Of the nine members on the board, four were appointed by the zone president and
five by the provincial council, which, in turn, was elected by the residents of Zone A. Id. This
system assured that the States administering the condominium would exercise some control
over the administrative board, but ultimate power would be vested in Zone A residents, who
elected the majority of the board members.
The leading positions at the provincial level were more closely controlled by the sover-
eign States. On their behalf, "the zone president appointed the president of the province, as
well as the provincial council. The provincial authorities were responsible for the administra-
tion of welfare services and for the maintenance of roads ...." Id. at 293. The zone,
provincial, and communal authorities-including the zone president and the administrative
board-reported to the Trieste Department of the Interior. ECON. COOPERATION ADMIN., SUR-
VEY OF THE ECONOMY OF TRIESTE: YEARS 1938 AND 1948, at 64 (1949). The Allied Command
appointed the heads of the six communes directly. NOVAK, supra note 122, at 293. They were
called sindaco (mayor). Id. The mayor was assisted by a communal board, which was, in turn,
appointed by the zone president. Id.
133. See NOVAK, supra note 122, at 272.
134. See id.
135. See JACQUES LEPRETTE, LE STATUT INTERNATIONAL DE TRIESTE 112 (1949).




140. NOVAK, supra note 122, at 284.
141. See id.
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control over Trieste's economy and slowed the development of an inde-
pendent economy.142
The Trieste experience is notable for some of the practical lessons
that it can teach us about the process of building a condominium. With
respect to the governing structure and layers of authority, Trieste suc-
cessfully implemented a system by which more local control could be
exercised at the lower levels. The sovereign powers administering the
territory could protect their rights and interests at the macro level, while
officials selected locally could control the day-to-day functions of the
government. However, if anything, the Trieste arrangement did not de-
volve enough authority to the lower levels. That said, though, one
potential problem with the devolution of power in that manner is that a
dominant ethnic group can seize control of the administration. In Trieste,
the Italian majority took advantage of its dominant position over the
Slovenian minority.
43
On voting rights, open publication of voter rolls creates additional
transparency. The process of determining eligible voters, while often
contentious, is also one of the most important steps in building a sense of
local ownership. In Trieste, the Allied Command held municipal elec-
tions only after it had implemented its own administrative structure.'"
Thereafter, the director general of the Free Territory issued an order call-
ing for the creation of voter rolls.'4 After much debate, the Order defined
eligible voters as
142. Over time, through agreements signed in April and October of 1948, Italy gradually
gained further control over the economy of Zone A. By the end of September 1948, Zone A
had become a part of the Italian economy, controlled directly by Rome. Id. at 286. Yugoslavia
lodged formal complaints against each of the agreements that ceded greater authority over
Zone A to Italy. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia to
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1054/CORR. I (Nov. 2, 1948). In fact, from
the beginning, Italy had been ensured a dominant position in Zone A when it was allowed to
maintain control over Italian state and parastatal property in Zone A during the condominium
period. NOVAK, supra note 122, at 287. With a foothold in the Trieste territorial zone, Italy
was able to expand the ambit of its authority.
143. At the outset, the Anglo-American coalition ran the Department of Education.
NOVAK, supra note 122, at 298. The first head of the Department was a U.S. national; his
successor was English. Id. Each was supported by two advisors with equal status, one a
Slovenian, the other Italian. Id. However, when the British head of the Department of Educa-
tion stepped down from his post, he was replaced by the Italian advisor, who immediately
stopped consulting with the Slovenian advisor and soon abolished the Slovenian advisor's
position altogether. Id. As a model for future condominia, this system was a complete failure.
As soon as the neutral officials stepped away from the educational process, the Italian official
imposed his will and thus the will of the Italian majority over the Slovenian minority. See id.
144. Id. at 301. The voting list system and the resulting proportional representation
scheme mirrored the Italian political model.
145. Id. The date of the election was selected directly by the Allied Command, but the
election was organized by the zone president. Id. at 301-02. Even though the President was
appointed by the Allied Command, he maintained a relative degree of independence.
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all male and female persons-to whom the right of voting is
hereby expressly extended-who on 15 September 1947 were
Italian citizens and have reached or will reach the age of 21
within December 31, 1948 and are lawfully inscribed in the Reg-
ister of the Permanent Population of one of the Communes of
the Zone.'46




On citizenship, citizens should be provided the right to become citi-
zens of the local authority, even if their ethnicity, as in the case of the
Slovenian minority, might not directly lead to citizenship. Trieste ad-
dressed issues of citizenship, but, since the Free Territory was initially
created as a future independent State (rather than as a long-term condo-
minium), its dictates on citizenship are most useful simply as an example
of the contours of the citizenship considerations at stake in a condomin-
ium setting .
146. Order No. 345: Provisions Concerning the Compilation of Electoral Rolls art. II, in
I ALLIED MILITARY-GOVERNMENT: BRITISH-UNITED STATES ZONE FREE TERRITORY OF
TRIESTE, ANALYTICAL INDEX TO OFFICIAL GAZETrE 383 [583] [hereinafter Order No. 345].
"Each person on the electoral rolls had the right to vote and the right to be elected." NOVAK,
supra note 122, at 303. One point of particular acrimony was the base date of residence in the
Trieste region. When the date was shifted from 1940 (as it had been in earlier drafts) to 1947,
all Italian refugees who had settled in Trieste during or after the war were granted the right to
vote. Id. at 304. These additional voters influenced the outcome of the elections in favor of
Italy and to the detriment of Yugoslavia and the Slovenian population in Trieste. See Memo-
randum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia to the President of the Security
Council, supra note 142.
147. NOVAK, supra note 122, at 302. Fascists who had held the highest positions in the
party of state administration were excluded from the voting process. Id. In addition, anyone
who had lost or who stood to lose his Italian citizenship was removed from the electoral rolls.
Id.
148. Issues of citizenship are particularly complex in the context of condominia. In some
cases, citizens of a condominium territory are granted the opportunity to select between (or
among) the governing States. In some cases of dual sovereignty, citizens are automatically
considered citizens of both States and are subject to the benefits and costs of dual sovereignty.
In all cases, however, citizens of condominium territories are not entitled to take on the citi-
zenship of States that are not governing the territory, unless the citizen in question has an
independent basis for claiming that citizenship.
149. See Treaty of Peace with Italy, supra note 118, art. 19. Article 19 of the permanent
statute creating the Free Territory defined the rights of citizenship in the following manner:
"Italian citizens who were domiciled on June 10, 1940," in the area comprised within the
boundaries of the Free Territory, "and their children born after that date, shall ... become
citizens [of the Free Territory] with full civil and political rights .... Upon becoming citizens
[of the Free Territory],. . . they shall lose their Italian citizenship." Id.
When the Free Territory was divided into two zones, the provisions on citizenship were
altered. Those who had possessed Slovenian nationality, but who remained in the territory of
Zone A generally, became citizens of Italy after 1954. Id. art. 20. In the interim, many re-
mained citizens of Yugoslavia, although, as described above, citizenship was defined more
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The Trieste condominium experience also suggests several lessons
on what to avoid in establishing a condominium. In several different are-
nas, the Allied Powers allowed Italy to exercise dominant control over
decision-making authority, and the Italians abused that power. This les-
son appears again in the Sudanese experience, in which the British
dominance of the condominium meant that there was no check on its
rule. In Trieste, the decision to make Italian the de facto official lan-
guage, the selection of an Italian to succeed an Englishman and a U.S.
national as the head of the Department of Education, and the selection of
Italian currency and customs regulations all led to a dominant role for
the Italians over the Slovenian minority."" The Italians took advantage of
their position, and, in turn, the governing Allied partners did not place
sufficient checks on the Italian power. The system that favored Italian
control on these issues had its benefits, however, particularly in terms of
convenience and clarity. Given the short-term interests at the heart of the
Trieste arrangement, these benefits may actually have outweighed the
costs. However, in a longer-term condominium, the balance would shift
significantly. As a reminder, it is this precise constraint-a short-term
vision to joint sovereignty as a solution-that has in fact led to the fail-
ure of past condominia.'5'
Sudan: Hybrid Condominium. Like the condominium in Trieste, the
condominium in Sudan combined a distant sovereign with a contiguous
sovereign to govern jointly. The United Kingdom and Egypt jointly con-
trolled Sudan from 1898 to 1955. 52 However, unlike in Trieste, in Sudan,
the contiguous power (Egypt) did not exercise dominant control over the
territory.' 3 Even though both the British and Egyptian flags flew over
Sudan, the administrative and military commands were controlled en-
tirely by the British.'5 4 In fact, the first three governors of the Sudan were
broadly, allowing Italian refugees who had settled in Trieste during and after the war to be-
come citizens of the Free Territory. Id.
150. See LEPRETTE, supra note 135, at 138.
151. The Schleswig-Holstein condominium serves as an example of a condominium
created-and governed-with a short-term solution in mind. The condominium only lasted
from 1864 until 1866 and served simply as a placeholder until a shift of power allowed Prussia
to assert complete autonomy over the territory. See CORET, supra note 31, at 189-93 (noting
also that the Treaty of Prague of August 23, 1865, marked the official passage of full sover-
eignty over the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein to Prussia and noting January 12, 1867, as
the date on which they were officially incorporated by Prussia).
152. See P.M. HOLT & M.W. DALY, THE HISTORY OF THE SUDAN: FROM THE COMING OF
ISLAM TO THE PRESENT DAY 118 (1979). The British crafted the hybrid condominium ar-
rangement in lieu of direct annexation because Britain's own claim to Sudan was based on
Egyptian claims to the territory, claims that Britain co-opted as its own by pointing out its
dominant position in Egypt. See id. at 117-18.
153. Id. at 118.
154. Id. Lord Cromer, Britain's consul-general in Egypt at the time of the formation of
the condominium, was instructed to inform the Egyptian leadership that "[hier Majesty's Gov-
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British nationals who combined their duties in Sudan with their roles as
sirdar (commander-in-chief) of the British-run Egyptian army.'5 Thus,
whereas Sudan was, in theory, jointly administered by Egypt and the
United Kingdom, the British occupied the meaningful positions in the
administration and, therefore, exercised authority over decision-making
in the territory. Ultimately, because it failed to give true meaning to the
notion of joint sovereignty inherent in condominia, the Sudanese con-
dominium has been accused of fostering the sectarian politics that have
divided Sudan since independence and of creating economic hegemonies
that doomed Sudan to economic hardships far worse than virtually any
other British colonial possession in Africa.'56
The primary lesson to be drawn from the Sudanese condominium is
that the legal nature of a condominium can be obscured when one State
wields a disproportionate amount of power in the arrangement. Further-
more, even where neither of the governing powers is subordinate to the
other (as Egypt was to the United Kingdom), administration of the con-
dominium should be divided so that one State is not left in de facto
absolute control of the territorial governance.
B. Water Condominia
Although most condominium arrangements concern pieces of land, a
condominium may also grant joint sovereignty over a body of water.'57 In
emnment consider that they have a predominant voice in all matters connected with the Sudan,
and that they expect that any advice which they may think fit to tender to the Egyptian Gov-
ernment with respect to Sudan affairs will be followed." MEKKI ABBAS, THE SUDAN
QUESTION: THE DISPUTE OVER THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN CONDOMINIUM 1884-1951, at 46
(Margery Perham ed., 1952) (quoting The Marques of Salisbury to Lord Cromer, Aug. 2,
1898, FO. 78/4955). The British government based its right to control the condominium on
the "substantial military and financial co-operation which has recently been offered by Her
Majesty's Government to the Government of the Khedive." Id.
155. See ARTHUR WHITE, THE EXPANSION OF EGYPT UNDER ANGLO-EGYPTIAN CON-
DOMINIUM 424 (1899); PETER WOODWARD, CONDOMINIUM AND SUDANESE NATIONALISM 2
(1979).
156. See M.W. DALY, IMPERIAL SUDAN: THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN CONDOMINIUM 396-97
(1991).
157. Unlike condominia over land, water condominia generally involve only frontier
claims, in which neighboring States dispute a body of water that abuts on the land of each
State. For example, Austria, Germany, and Switzerland are currently engaged in debate over
the status of Lake Constance, which lies on the frontier of all three States. See Joachim Blat-
ter, Lessons from Lake Constance: Ideas, Institutions, and Advocacy Coalitions, in
REFLECTIONS ON WATER: NEW APPROACHES TO TRANSBOUNDARY CONFLICTS AND COOPERA-
TION 89 (Joachim Blatter & Helen Ingram eds., 2001). The Austrians claim that the three
riparian States possess a condominium over a part of the waters forming the boundary up to a
zone near the shore (the Obersee). See id. By contrast, Switzerland and Germany argue that
the waters should be divided among the three States according to the proportional amount of
shoreline. See id. The conception of a condominium over Lake Constance is not a new one.
Indeed, the Lake was the subject of condominium discussion, negotiation, and at times even
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terms of joint sovereignty arrangements for enclosed or semi-enclosed
areas of water, there are two major cases of condominium.'58
Dutch-Prussian Frontier Stream. In 1816, Prussia and the Nether-
lands signed an agreement vesting ownership of frontier waterways
jointly in the two States. 59 According to the agreement, all waterways
running between the two countries were to be governed jointly, with
equal rights to use and appropriate resources.' 6° However, not long after
the agreement went into effect, the legal question of whether one of the
contracting States could take unilateral action that would affect the
course of a jointly owned stream arose. 16' Answering this question, the
Supreme Administrative Court for Germany ruled that the States had
created a condominium-type arrangement and that, as a result, both
States exercised joint jurisdiction over frontier waterways with the fur-
ther result that the jurisdiction of each State was limited by that of the
other.162  Thus, neither State could legislate unilaterally over the
treatment in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See CORET, supra note 31, at
145-46. Lake Titicaca in South America has likewise been the subject of dispute between two
neighboring States, in this case Peru and Bolivia. Over the years, condominium has similarly
been proposed as a solution to that dispute. See, e.g., LuIs DE ITURRALDE CHINEL, EL LAGO
TITICACA Y LA TEORIA DEL CONDOMINIO (1959).
158. Another example of a water condominium is Baie du Figuier. By a "Declaration" in
1879, the Bale du Figuier became a condominium of France and Spain. Land, Island and
Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.: Nicar. intervening), 1992 I.C.J. 351, 600 (Sept.
11). However, condominium status did not lead to a change in the status of the waters or in the
activities of either State.
159. See Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, supra note 68.
160. See id. Article 27 of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle stated:
Unless otherwise stipulated, wherever brooks, streams or rivers are boundaries, they
will be common to both States .... There shall be no changes in the flow of the
rivers, nor in the banks, and no concession or fight to draw water shall be granted
without the participation and consent of both governments; the same principles will
apply to ditches, channels, paths, canals, hedges, or any other object used as a limit,
[this is to say,] sovereignty over these objects shall be shared by the two Powers.
[Fishing] [c]atch[es] will also be common and will continue to be sold at public
auction for the benefit of both States.
Id. art. 27.
161. ANNUAL DIGEST & REPORTS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES: YEARS 1931
& 1932, at 50 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 1938).
162. In this case, the appellant ran a mill at a stream that ran along the boundary of
Germany and Holland. Id. He drew water from the stream to run the mill; he returned any
unused water to the stream. Id. The miller applied for registration of these water rights in the
Water Register, in accordance with the German Water Act. Id. The District Committee that
reviewed these applications, however, denied it on the grounds that, under the Frontier Agree-




stream. 63 As a consequence, Prussia was not free to enter into an agree-
ment with another State that involved "frontier streams that were subject
to the joint jurisdiction of Prussia and the Netherlands."
' 14
The Frontier Stream experience provides two important lessons for
framers of condominia-whether over water or land. The first is that a
State's judicial body can objectively decide issues of central importance
to the maintenance of the condominium. In the context of this particular
condominium, the dispute taken to the Prussian court was the essential
issue of condominium governance. The court issued a decision that up-
held the underlying principles at the expense of Prussia. The second
lesson of the Frontier Stream condominium relates to the ability of
States to share resources. Prussia and the Netherlands shared rights to
the boundary stream and, even though a boundary stream can be admin-
istered more easily than a condominium over a contiguous territory, the
positive experience in sharing resources indicates that States, like peo-
ple, are capable of exercising joint ownership.
Gulf of Fonseca. The second and most important precedent for water
condominia is the landmark International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision
on the status of the Gulf of Fonseca. 6 The Gulf of Fonseca lies off the
Pacific coast of El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The Gulf of
Fonseca condominium is of particular interest because it was created not
by express agreement among the concerned parties, but rather by judicial
decision.'6 The dispute between Honduras and El Salvador, which led to
the ICJ case, had three elements: (1) a dispute over the land boundary
between the two States; (2) a dispute over the legal situation of the is-
lands in the Gulf of Fonseca;16 and (3) a dispute over the legal status of
maritime spaces and resources within and outside the Gulf.'68 The ICJ
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salv. v. Hond.: Nicar. interven-
ing), 1992 I.C.J. 351 (Sept. 11). The case is better known for a different reason, namely as the
first case in which a third party intervenor was allowed to participate in the proceedings. See
id. at 609. Nicaragua was permitted to intervene in the dispute, but only with respect to the
status of the waters of the Gulf of Fonseca. Id. at 360. This decision led to a lengthy discourse
by the ICJ on the applicability of its findings to Nicaragua, the third party. The ICJ held that
the terms under which intervention was granted were such that Nicaragua could not become a
party to the proceedings. Id. Accordingly, the binding force of the judgment for the parties did
not extend to Nicaragua as intervenor. Id. at 609.
166. Id. at 598.
167. Id. at 579. The ICJ reviewed claims to disputed islands in the Gulf and awarded the
Isla del Tigre to Honduras and the islands of Meanguera and Meanguerita to El Salvador. Id.
at 569-70.
168. Id. at 380.
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decision was complex and fact specific.' 69 Only the third dispute is of
interest here.
In its decision, the ICJ held that the Gulf of Fonseca should be held
in condominium, concluding that the Gulf had long been treated as a
unified entity that should remain undivided. 70 In reaching its decision,
the ICJ relied primarily on a 1917 ruling by the Central American Court
of Justice (CACJ), which held that the Gulf should be held in condomin-
ium. " ' Although the ICJ concluded that the waters could be divided upon
agreement by all three parties, it otherwise respected the terms of the
1917 decision, which stated that the three countries possessed joint
rights within the Gulf.'
The 1917 decision arose from a 1914 dispute between El Salvador
and Nicaragua over a treaty signed by Nicaragua with the United States
(the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty).'73 There, the CACJ held that
[B]y the concession of a naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca, the
Bryan-Chamorro Treaty ... violates [El Salvador's] coowner-
ship in the said Gulf... [t]hat the Government of Nicaragua is
under the obligation-availing itself of all possible means pro-
vided by international law-to reestablish and maintain the legal
'74status that existed prior to the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty ....
The 1917 decision left one major question open, inasmuch as it
found that the Gulf was co-owned except "as to the littoral (coastal) ma-
rine league [of three miles] which is the exclusive property of each.'75
169. See Freddy Cuevas, Presidents Agree to Honor Decision Ending Long Border Dis-
pute, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. I1, 1992. Presiding Judge Jose Sette-Camara of Brazil stated
that "[i]t was the most complicated case the Court [had] ever handled." Id.
170. See Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, 1992 I.C.J. at 601.
171. See Republic of El Salvador v. Republic of Nicaragua, Central American Court of
Justice, Mar. 9, 1917, translated in 11 AM J. INT'L L. 674 (1917) [hereinafter Republic of El
Salvador v. Republic of Nicaragua]. As a general rule, "gulfs and bays enclosed by the land of
more than one littoral State, however narrow their entrance may be, are non-territorial." See I
OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, at 716. Such bodies of water are considered to be part of the open
sea. Id.
172. See Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, 1992 I.C.J. at 351. During the
colonial period, the Gulf had belonged only to Spain. Id. at 558. Initially, the area that now
comprises El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua remained as a single State, and the Gulf
survived intact even after the dissolution of the Spanish colonial empire. Id. at 589. Eventu-
ally, three States emerged. They continued to share the Gulf of Fonseca without major conflict
until 1914 when Nicaragua provoked litigation with El Salvador by signing the Bryan-
Chamorro Treaty with the United States. Id. at 590.
173. See Republic of El Salvador v. Republic of Nicaragua, supra note 171. The Treaty
was signed on August 5, 1914. It provided for a U.S. naval base in Nicaragua's portion of the
Gulf of Fonseca. Id.
174. Id. at 730.
175. Id. at 716. The parties had agreed-and the Central American Court of Justice
(CACJ) accepted-the principle that each State possessed a "littoral marine league" (a three-
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The CACJ qualified the Gulf as an "historic bay," meaning that the wa-
ters were "territorial waters" under the shared and undivided ownership
of the three countries. 16 Specifically, the CACJ held that "[o]ne copar-
cener cannot lawfully alter, or deliver into the hands of an outsider, or
even share with [an outsider], the use and enjoyment of the thing held in
common .... ,17 However, as to the three-mile zone off the coastline of
each riparian State, each State exercised exclusive jurisdiction.
The resulting ambiguity served as the basis for Nicaragua's claims to
exclusive control over one-third of the Gulf.'79 Relying on the 1917 deci-
sion, the ICJ ruled that the waters of the Gulf are not international;
rather, they are a closed condominium of the three countries, with each
country given the right to an exclusive three-mile coastal strip, subject to
rights of innocent passage. 80 The ICJ agreed with the CACJ and rea-
soned that the Gulf constituted historical waters, limiting the rights of
each State with respect to the others.'8 ' The ICJ further concluded that
the Gulf waters were subject to joint sovereignty of the three coastal
States.'82 The decision created a community of interests among the States
that was to be respected by each so as to allow the other co-sovereigns to
enjoy the resources and rights of the Gulf equally. 83
The Gulf of Fonseca decision demonstrates several basic, but impor-
tant, principles that can help to shape the reemergence of condominium
as a solution to boundary disputes. First, and perhaps most obvious, the
ICJ decision in the Gulf of Fonseca case demonstrates that condominium
can be a legitimate tool for the resolution of territorial disputes. Second,
condominium is a device that can be used to resolve disputes among
mile zone contiguous to its coastline), which was the exclusive domain of each State. Id. The
CACJ also recognized an additional zone of nine nautical miles as a secondary zone of author-
ity, granting rights of inspection and police power for fiscal and national security purposes. Id.
at 715. Finally, the CACJ noted that merchant vessels of third States enjoyed a right of uso
innocente in the nonlittoral waters of the Gulf, which is to say the waters outside the three-
mile exclusive jurisdiction zone reserved to each State. See id. at 715.
176. Id. at 704-05.
177. Id. at 712.
178. See id. at 716.
179. See Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salv. v. Hond.: Nicar. interven-
ing), 1992 I.C.J. 351, 589-90 (Sept. 11).
180. See id. at 616. In a vigorous dissent, Judge Oda of Japan argued that the concept of
a "pluri-State" bay has no legal basis. Id. at 733 (separate opinion of Judge Oda). He argued
that the waters of the Gulf of Fonseca consisted of a sum of the territorial seas of each State.
Id.
181. Id. at 598-601.
182. See id. at 601.
183. Id. at 602-03. The Court further held that the closing line of the Gulf, which is used
to determine the legal status of the waters outside the Gulf, constituted the baseline of the
territorial sea. Id. at 617. Thus, all three joint sovereigns that have rights inside the closing line
also possess rights outside that line to the territorial sea, continental shelf, and exclusive eco-
nomic zone. See id. at 608.
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several States and not only when the dispute involves two States. Third,
States can abide by the rules of a condominium, even when significant
interests are at stake. So, whereas one might argue that the relevance of
the Frontier Stream case is limited by the small stakes in play there, the
Gulf of Fonseca dispute involved significant rights to resources, includ-
ing fish and minerals. Thus, the success to date of the three
condominium partners in governing the Gulf of Fonseca condominium
indicates that sovereign States can share valuable resources without pro-
tracted conflict or a tragedy-of-the-commons-type depletion of
resources.
II. CONDOMINIUM DISTINGUISHED
Much of the criticism of condominium is in fact misplaced, born of
confusion between condominium and other forms of joint sovereignty in
international lawi 4 Part II will therefore explain distinctions between
condominium and these other joint sovereignty arrangements.
A. Coimperium
A condominium and a coimperium denote an arrangement composed
of two elements: (1) a formal association of two or more subjects of in-
ternational law (generally, States) and (2) a joint exercise of authority
within a particular territory."5 The two concepts are distinctive not for
their form, but for their purpose. A condominium exists when two or
more States exercise joint sovereignty over a territory that belongs to the
administering States, whereas a coimperium exists when they exercise
joint sovereignty over a third party's territory."6 Thus, by its nature, a
coimperium is designed as a caretaker regime, whereas, in principle at
least, a condominium is intended to serve the interests of the administer-
ing powers themselves. One of the primary reasons why the concept of a
condominium has been discarded is that the governing principles of
184. See, e.g., I PAUL FAUCHILLE, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 684
(1922) (noting that international law includes cases of co-ownership over territory and that
such cases-known as condominium or coimperium-arise where two sovereigns exercise
their indivisible power over the same territory); Milan Sahovic & William W. Bishop, The
Authority of the State: Its Range with Respect to Persons and Place, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 311, 317 (Max Sorensen ed., 1968) (stating that "some territories ...
have been subject to a division of authority between two or more states .... The most fre-
quent form of this kind of divided authority over the same territory is termed 'condominium'
or 'coimperium.'"); Schneider, supra note 19, at 734.
185. CORET, supra note 3 1, at 73.
186. See id. at 72 (defining a coimperium as "a regime in which a partial international
community exercises certain competences [(powers)] over a portion of the territory of a third
state").
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many past condominium regimes more closely resembled the features
one might expect of a coimperium, in which States do not exercise the
same level of consideration and judgment that they do over their own
sovereign territory. This state of affairs leads to short-term decisions,
rather than to sustainable ones, and it ultimately dooms the arrangement
to failure. It explains why a coimperium will not work as well as con-
dominium, and it also explains why some past condominia-treated as a
coimperium-have failed.'87
Under both arrangements, the component parts are most often de-
fined by treaty, and the partners are bound by the contractual rights
established in the treaty. In a coimperium, however, the partners do not
exercise full sovereign rights over the territory in question.' Their role
in the territory is akin to that of a caretaker, whereby the administering
States are charged with administering the territory on behalf of others.
By this definition, after World War II, the administration of Germany by
the allied powers constituted a coimperium. Although Germany had lost
the war and had surrendered unconditionally, it had not abandoned its
status as a subject of international law. Consequently, the Allied Powers
were occupying foreign territory and lacked full sovereign power over it.
The laws applied in postwar Germany were designed to maintain order
and rebuild the German State. These are features of a coimperium. By
contrast, had Germany been governed as a condominium, consideration
would have been given to incorporating the laws of the administering
powers to apply to German citizens. Similarly, German nationals would
have been stripped of their citizenship and would have been compelled
to become citizens of one or more of the States exercising sovereignty.
B. Mandates, Trusts, Non-Self-Governing Territories, and Protectorates
Condominia must also be distinguished from the four primary terri-
torial arrangements established in the wake of the two world wars and as
a consequence of the dismantling of colonial empires: mandates, trust
territories, non-self-governing territories, and protectorates. ' Each of
187. For example, the Anglo-Egyptian condominium over Sudan-which had other
problems discussed earlier-also suffered from treatment by the governing powers that lacked
long-term considerations in part because both governing powers behaved merely as caretakers.
See id. at 300.
188. See Arrigo Cavaglieri, Regles Generales du Droit de la Paix, 26 RECUE1L DES
COURs 315, 388-89 (1929).
189. Mandates and protectorates emerged following World War I, while trusteeships and
non-self-governing territories were devices created after World War II, in conjunction with the
formation of the United Nations. For a more thorough discussion of this topic, including the
role of international territorial administrations (ITA), see Ralph Wilde, From Danzig to East
imor and Beyond: The Role of International Territorial Administration, 95 AM. J. INT'L L.
583, 601-03 (2001) (noting that an ITA can take two approaches to a governance problem by
Michigan Journal of International Law
these arrangements has been confused, at one time or another, with con-
dominia.'9 Yet, all four are fundamentally different in nature from
condominia.' 9' Unlike condominia, mandates, trusteeships, and non-self-
governing territories were established for the explicit purpose of allow-
ing the territories to work toward independence. In addition, with very
few exceptions, none of these arrangements involved joint action and in
none of the cases did that joint action involve shared sovereignty. Only
protectorates conferred rights that might be inherent to sovereign pow-
ers, and those rights were ceded through negotiated solutions. Finally, all
four of these arrangements were intended as interim solutions to the
quandary of resolving the impediments of colonialism. Therefore, unlike
condominia, these territorial devices were not intended to lead to any
long-term, power-sharing agreement.
1. Mandates
After World War I, the newly formed League of Nations was charged
with devising a solution to the complex postwar territorial issues that had
fueled the war and threatened to undermine the postwar order.'92 The
either directly substituting international organizations for local actors or by changing the
"structural features of local governance to remove the problem that led to the need for the
ITA" and further observing that many suggest that mandates are precursors to an ITA whereas
trusteeships are more of an alternative).
190. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 19, at 734.
191. In general, the rights of all dependent territories include the right to "freely dispose
of... natural wealth and resources ... [the] right to complete freedom, the exercise of their
sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory." Declaration on the Granting of Inde-
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. Doc. AIRES/1514
(XV) (Dec. 14, 1960), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/
NRO/152/88/IMG/NR015288.pdf?OpenElement. In itself, this explicit reference to the exer-
cise of sovereignty distinguishes these post-colonial arrangements from the joint sovereignty
doctrine that drives condominia.
192. See F.B. Francis Sayre, Legal Problems Arising From the U.N. Trusteeship System,
42 AM. J. INT'L L. 263, 263 (1948). Mandates (and protectorates) were the product of rushed
solutions to the unanticipated problems resulting from the decisive allied victory in 1918. The
dissolution of the Turkish Empire, as well as of the Austria-Hungary dual monarchy, the dis-
mantling of Germany, and the re-mapping of Europe at the Paris Peace Conference of 1918
not only created political tension, but also posed a legal dilemma: what country would be the
sovereign of the re-mapped territories during the period from their cession from their prewar
State until the final settlements had been prepared? Many writers tried to solve the legal prob-
lems by resorting to the formula of condominium, asserting that the territories were under the
condominium of the Allied and Associated powers. EL-ERIAN, supra note 28, at 79. Five in-
terpretations were suggested: (1) title in the Principal Allied and Associated Powers; (2) title
in the League of Nations; (3) title in the Mandatory Powers; (4) title in the Inhabitants of the
Mandated Territories; and (5) joint title in the League of Nations and the Mandated Power. Id.
Although it might appear that mandates created under the first, third, or fifth interpreta-
tions would conform with condominium principles, a number of national courts distinguished
all of the mandates from condominia, noting the novel status of mandate territories in interna-




League of Nations devised two solutions to protect territories with un-
certain or disputed sovereignty: mandates and protectorates.'93 Mandates
were created in order to administer and develop territories that were
characterized as "not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous
conditions of the modem world."1 94
Mandates divested all of the administering powers of sovereignty in
the territory.'95 This arrangement, where no State commands sovereign
there was no cession of the German possessions to the Principal Powers .... The
animus essential to a legal cession was not present on either side .... The intention
of the signatories seems to have been to place them [the territories] under a basis
new to international law and regulated primarily by Article 22 [of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations].
ld; see also Frost v. Stevenson (1937) 58 C.L.R. 528, 550-52 (Austl.). The Frost court, in a
case that raised a question regarding the extent of the British Commonwealth's legislative
powers in the mandated territory of New Guinea, ruled that
[t]he grant of mandates introduced a new principle into international law .... The
position of a mandatory in relation to a mandated territory must be regarded as sui
generis. The Treaty of Peace, read as a whole, avoids cession of territory to the
mandatory, and, in the absence of definite evidence to the contrary, it must ... be
taken that New Guinea has not become part of the Dominions of the Crown.
Id.
193. See J.L. Brierly, Trusts and Mandates, 10 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 217, 219 (1929).
Brierly stated,
Anglo-Saxon law has two different regimes for property, viz., ownership and trust;
International law has two different regimes for government, viz., sovereignty (under
whatever reserves we like to make as to the meaning of the term) and mandate.
Mandated territories have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the state which
formerly governed them; they have passed into the regime of mandate. It is idle to
attempt to force the mandate, which is a social institution, into the individualistic
concept of sovereignty, as it is to force the trust into a scheme based only on private
property.
Id.
194. League of Nations Covenant art. 22. The mandate system was established under
Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, but the rights and obligations of the mandatory
powers were outlined in specific mandates for each territory. See id.
195. The terms of each mandate varied according to the specific circumstances of each
territory, but there were certain obligations for the administering country included in each of
the mandates. First, the administering country was obliged to act with a view toward the well-
being and development of the territory's inhabitants, explicitly forbidding the economic ex-
ploitation of the territory or its population. Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of
International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of
Nations, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 513, 525 (2002). In addition, and, perhaps most impor-
tantly, the administration of the mandate was to be supervised by the League of Nations. Id. at
524. Issues of nationality, diplomatic protection, and the practical issues of administration
were largely left up to the mandatory power. See id. at 526-27. Nevertheless, the League
Council made certain recommendations regarding administrative issues. See League of Na-
tions Covenant art. 22.
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authority, leads to a void in power. 96 As Sir Arnold McNair noted in the
ICJ's Advisory Opinion on the status of South-West Africa,
The Mandates System is a new institution-a new relationship
between territory and its inhabitants on the one hand and the
government which represents them internationally on the
other-a new species of international government, which does
not fit into the old conception of sovereignty and which is alien
to it. Sovereignty in a mandated territory is in abeyance; if and
when the inhabitants of the territory obtain recognition as an in-
dependent state, sovereignty will revive and vest in the state.
97
As McNair pointed out, the mandate system challenged prevailing no-
tions of sovereignty. However, the mandates did not force multiple States
to share sovereignty over a territory. Instead, they allowed an outside
body (the League of Nations) to identify an administering authority,
which, in turn, governed the territory.'98 Many of the territories that Pro-
fessor Schneider's definition of condominium in Encyclopedia of Public
International Law identifies as problematic condominia' were in fact
mandates, with problems stemming not from joint sovereignty, but rather
from the different form of sharing inherent to this mandate structure.
The mandate system operated for less than twenty years, and the
mandate agreements led to a de facto state of affairs in which the territo-
196. Note that at the time of the creation of the mandate system, an alternative existed:
to vest sovereignty in multiple States and allow them to govern. That system, of course, would
have been a condominium-type arrangement, governed under the auspices of an international
organization.
197. International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 150 (July
11) (separate opinion of Judge McNair). For additional information on the South-West Africa
Mandate, see SOUTHWEST AFRICA UNDER MANDATE (Robert Love Braum ed., 1976).
198. See League of Nations Covenant art. 22. One example of the difficulty of governing
mandate territory was the experience of Memel, a port city that had been the subject of a long-
standing dispute between Germany and Lithuania. Memel lies on the Baltic Sea at the mouth
of the Niemen River and has a mixed population composed primarily of German and Lithua-
nian nationals. See CORET, supra note 31, at 196. Article 99 of the Treaty of Versailles severed
Memel and the surrounding district from Germany. See Treaty of Versailles, supra note 90, art.
99; CORET, supra note 31, at 196. Memel was placed under a French administration that gov-
erned under a League of Nations mandate. See CORET, supra note 31, at 196.
The governance of Memel was a failure. France, England, Italy, and Japan were given
governing authority over the territory by Article 99 of the Treaty of Versailles. See CORET,
supra note 31, at 196. Disagreement over governance and the status of the territory led to an
uprising by a group of Lithuanian partisans in January 1923. See id. The partisans succeeded
in establishing a revolutionary government. See id. The insurgency led the governing States to
take urgent action to find a permanent solution for the small territory. See id. On February 16,
1923, the four governing States agreed to transfer sovereignty over the territory to Lithuania.
Lithuanian sovereignty over Memel was formally recognized on May 8, 1924, when Great
Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States signed a convention that had been agreed to
in the spring of 1923 by their representatives. See id.
199. See Schneider, supra note 19, at 734.
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ries were administered as colonies while the system was in place. After
the League of Nations fell apart, the mandate system could no longer
exist. However, the system evolved under the supervision of the United
Nations, and the mandate system was ultimately subsumed into the trus-
teeship system.
2. The United Nations Trusteeship System
The United Nations Trusteeship system, now defunct, incorporated
the territories of the mandate system under the League of Nations; how-
ever, it allowed for closer supervision of the administering States.2 0 The
system was created to continue, and sometimes to initiate, the admini-
stration of territories that were not entirely self-governing.20' The central
goal of the trusteeship system was for the people of the territories to fol-
low a "progressive development towards self-government." 20 2 While most
trusteeships were governed by only one State, trusteeships have most
often been confused with condominia where multiple States adminis-
tered the trusteeship during its period of pre-independence incubation.0 3
Today, all of the trust territories under the trusteeship system have
achieved self-government in accordance with the objective articulated in
Article 76(b) of the U.N. Charter. 4
200. U.N. Charter arts. 75-91.
201. Id. arts. 75, 77. In line with the wide-ranging goals of the trusteeship system, ad-
ministering States were given only a blueprint for the arrangement to be developed with the
trustee territory, in the form of a trusteeship agreement. The trusteeship agreements for the
eleven former mandates were very similar to the agreements under the mandate system. Each
trusteeship agreement defined the territory, designated the administering authority, and out-
lined the obligations of that authority. See id. arts. 79, 81.
202. Dietrich Rauschning, United Nations Trusteeship System, in IV ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 19, at 1193, 1194. The objectives of the trusteeship
system were enumerated in greater detail than the objectives for the mandate system had been.
The trusteeship's objectives included: the promotion of the well-being and the interests of the
inhabitants of the territories; the promotion of political, economic, social, and educational
advancement within the territories; and the achievement of self-government. U.N. Charter art.
76.
203. Several different systems were adopted for administering the trusteeships. For ex-
ample, in Nauru, Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand jointly administered the territory.
See CHARMIAN E. TOUSSAINT, THE TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM OF THE UNITED NATIONS 79-80
(George Keeton & George Schwarzenberger eds., 1956). In practice, Australia acted as the
primary administrator for the territory in the name of all three States. Id. at 85. Two of the
countries, Australia and New Zealand, "did little to conceal their desire to annex the mandate
territory of Nauru because of its valuable phosphate deposits." Anghie, supra note 195, at 563.
By contrast, New Guinea, which is located in the same region as Nauru, was adminis-
tered solely by Australia. TOUSSAINT, supra, at 99 n.6. The trust agreement for New Guinea
contained a clause that allowed the administering country to treat the territory as an "integral
part of Australia," so long as this did not delay the development of self-government. Id. at 108.
204. James Crawford, State Practice and International Law in Relation to Secession, 69
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 85, 89 (1998). Article 76(b) states:
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3. Non-Self-Governing Territories
After 1945, the international community became more concerned
with the welfare of dependent territories that had not attained independ-
ence and with the condition of their inhabitants. As a result, all territories
that had not yet attained full self-government were given special status
under Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter; 25 this status created specific obli-
gations for the administering authorities.2
Although non-self-governing territories, unlike trusteeships, are not
administered under a detailed framework, the goal of the system is the
same, namely the achievement of self-government. 2°7 Self-government is
achieved only after the expression of the free will of the people of the
The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of
the United Nations laid down in Article I of the present Charter, shall be: ... (b) to
promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabi-
tants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-
government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances
of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples con-
cerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement ....
U.N. Charter art. 76(b).
In most cases, "the progress to self-government or independence was consensual. It oc-
curred with the agreement of the State responsible for the administration of the territory, in
accordance with law and pursuant to arrangements between the government of that State and
local leaders'" Crawford, supra, at 89.
205. U.N. Charter art. 73. The main difference between territories placed under the trus-
teeship system and non-self-governing territories is that trusteeships were subject to specific
requirements and procedures, while non-self-governing territories were not subject to those
strictures. See LELAND M. GOODRICH & EDVARD HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 406-07 (2d ed. 1949). Article 73 of the U.N. Charter
provides the guidelines for the administration of non-self-governing territories. The responsi-
bilities that flow from Article 73 of the Charter belong to "[m]embers of the United Nations
which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose people have
not yet attained a full measure of self-government... " U.N. Charter art. 73.
206. GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 205, at 408-09. This system was adopted after a
compromise within the United Nations between those countries that wanted the trusteeship
system extended to all colonial territories, and those resisting that type of arrangement. The
compromise led to the adoption of Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter and acknowledged the
responsibility of the United Nations in ensuring the eventual independence of the territories
under the system. It also guaranteed that Member States administering dependent territories
would "recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are
paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost ... the well-
being of the inhabitants of these territories." U.N. Charter art. 73. It was written to protect the
interests of territories not able to speak for themselves in international forums by ensuring that
a member of the United Nations entrusted with their welfare would be responsible for their
well-being. Thus, the underlying philosophy was to avoid leaving dependent territories de-
fenseless and voiceless in a world that had not yet accorded them independent status. For
example, Article 73(d) provides that administering powers have the responsibility "to promote
constructive measures of development" in the territories under their administration. Id. art.
73(d).
207. Compare U.N Charter art. 73(b), with id. art. 76(b).
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territory and cannot be based solely on historic claims to the territory208
Although non-self-governing territories occasionally relied on multiple
administering powers, the motives and operational rules of non-self-
governing territories distinguish them from condominia.
4. Protectorates
An international protectorate is a legal relationship between a pro-
tecting State and a protected State; the legal basis for the relationship
arises from a treaty signed between the parties involved .2  The treaty
proclaims that the protecting party will defend the protected State (or its
interests) against aggression. 2 0 There are many differences between a
protectorate and the three arrangements described immediately above.
Most importantly, a protectorate is itself a State.21' This distinguishes
protectorates not only from mandates, trusts, and non-self governing
208. However, the United Nations has never interpreted the practical requirements for, or
limits to, an Article 73 administering power. Therefore, it is unclear what measures would be
sufficient to meet the minimum standards required of an administering power.
The question of what is sufficient is more than a purely academic issue. For example,
ongoing negotiations over the status of the Western Sahara focus not only on the rights of
Morocco to assert its authority as an administering power, but also-assuming Morocco to be
the administering power-on the obligations imposed on Morocco under Article 73. Ques-
tions, such as whether Morocco, consistent with its obligations under Article 73, can enter into
oil concession agreements with private oil companies, and, if so, whether Morocco can use the
proceeds of such agreements, have arisen. See Thomas M. Franck, The Stealing of the Sahara,
70 AM. J. INT'L L. 694 (1976) (arguing that the historic claims that have been made to the
Western Sahara have stalled the achievement of self-government by the peoples of that terri-
tory).
209. See Gerhard Hoffman, Protectorates, in II ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, supra note 19, at 1153, 1154. There are different types of protectorates. In a
complete protectorate, the protector State can act on behalf of the protected State with regard
to foreign relations. Id. In a restricted protectorate, the protected State can make its own deci-
sions regarding foreign relations, subject to the approval of the protector State. Id.
Protectorates were most common during the time of imperial expansion and colonialism.
Id. During that period, the great powers had protectorate relationships with strategic countries.
Id. One example of a contemporary international arrangement that resembles a protectorate is
the relationship between France and Monaco. See id. The treaty between these two States has
been in place since 1918. Id. Monaco, although sovereign and independent, has signed "par-
ticular conventions with France." Constitution De La Principaute art. 1 (Monaco). French is
the national language, id. art. 8, and, until France and Monaco adopted the Euro as their offi-
cial currency, the Monegasque franc had the same value as the French franc. Dietrich
Schindler, Monaco, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 19, at
444, 444. There has been a French-Monegasque customs union since 1865. Id. According to
the treaty on the status of Monaco, signed in Paris on July 17, 1918, Monaco must "exercise
its rights of sovereignty in complete conformity with the political, military, naval and eco-
nomic interests of France." Treaty Establishing the Relations of France with the Principality of
Monaco, Fr.-Monaco, July 17, 1918, 981 U.N.T.S. 364.
210. See Hoffman, supra note 209, at 1154.
211. Id. at 1153.
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territories, but also from condominia, which are never independent
States themselves.
Regardless of the type of protectorate in question, the protected State
is still a State within the international sphere, and it is subject to interna-
tional law.2 Notably, "the protected State is still entitled to exercise
territorial jurisdiction over its own territory. Its citizens are neither sub-
ject to the legal order of the protecting State nor nationals of this
State. 2t 3 Protectorates only last as long as the treaty relationship between
the two parties is in force, and they are never considered a part of the
protecting State. Today, protectorates are not as important as they were
during colonial times, but, as with so many of the terms described here,
the territories that are, or have been, protectorates are sometimes con-
fused with condominia.
Although all four of these arrangements are quite distinct from the
joint sovereignty notion that is central to condominium, the terms are
used interchangeably, as if a condominium was closely related to a man-
date or a trust territory. In fact, other than the shared experience as a
solution to territorial complexities and a resort to relations with outside
powers, the condominium is an entirely different breed of animal. The
terms are confounded out of an indifference to the nuances of the lexicon
and not out of any uncertainty in the terms themselves.
C. Other International Territorial Arrangements
The concept of condominium also must be distinguished from two
special cases that involve two very different situations: military power
sharing and the Antarctic regime. Military power sharing lacks many of
the basic features of condominium governance, such as joint administra-
tion and a range of practical considerations, including citizenship, voting
rights, and governing laws. For example, the power-sharing arrangement
between the United Kingdom and the United States over the San Juan
Islands, which is described as a condominium, lacked the basic features
of condominium governance.2 4 For twelve years, from 1860 until 1872,
British and U.S. forces exercised joint sovereignty over the San Juan
Islands,t 5 which are located off the northwestern coast of the continental
United States. While this arrangement was intended to create a condo-
minium-type, power-sharing procedure, joint custody was restricted to
212. Id. at 1156.
213. Id.
214. See HUNTER MILLER, SAN JUAN ARCHIPELAGO: STUDY OF THE JOINT OCCUPATION
OF SAN JUAN ISLAND 171 (1943).
215. Id. at 9.
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military control.2 6 In all other affairs, British and U.S. authorities did not
govern the territory jointly. Thus, the Anglo-American arrangement in
the San Juan Islands was merely an instance of military occupation.2 7
One final international arrangement for joint sovereignty merits
mention: the Antarctic regime. It was established by the Antarctic Treaty
(the Treaty), which entered into force in 1961 .28 The Treaty is a unique
tool designed to resolve the particular issues involved in the claims to
Antarctica. The Treaty forbids national claims to Antarctica.2 9 It does
not attempt to solve the claims to territorial sovereignty over the conti-
nent, but instead creates a global commons and serves as a framework
agreement governing the use of mineral and other resources of Antarc-
tica.220 The limited scope of the Treaty has evolved into a system that
covers most of the potential activities in Antarctica. Indeed, the Antarctic
regime demonstrates that successful cooperation among States can be
achieved and maintained in spite of ongoing legal disputes. That said,
because of the unique issues at play in Antarctica, it cannot be used as a
model for other territorial disputes.' Moreover, whereas cooperation in
Antarctica has proceeded "with little outward sign of dissension," it is
less clear how the system will handle increasing pressures to develop
22Antarctica's resources and protect its environment.
216. See id. at 171-72 (noting that "joint occupation is exclusively military, and that civil
officers of neither power can exercise any jurisdiction or authority whatsoever there .... [The
British and U.S. forces] have no power to govern any of the inhabitants of the disputed terri-
tory").
217. Nonetheless, the San Juan Islands should be distinguished from other instances of
military occupation, such as Allied occupation of postwar Germany, which was not in any way
congruent with the notions of joint sovereignty that define a condominium.
218. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
219. See id. art. 4. The Antarctic Treaty states,
No acts or activities taking place while the present treaty is in force shall constitute
a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Ant-
arctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or
enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be as-
serted while the present Treaty is in force.
Id.
220. See Envtl. Def. Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
221. In particular, Antarctica's physical location and near year-round inaccessibility have
fostered cooperation, rather than competition, among States in exploiting the potential of the
territory. See, e.g., MARK JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 231-32 (4th ed.
2003).
222. F.M. AUBURN, ANTARCTIC LAW AND POLITICS 1 (1982); see also Christopher C.
Joyner, The Antarctic Minerals Negotiating Process, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 888 (1987).
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III. ON PROPERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY22 3
Property and sovereignty have long been treated as distinct entities
under the law. As Morris Cohen pointed out in his seminal lecture on
property and sovereignty in 1927, "[p]roperty and sovereignty ... be-
long to entirely different branches of the law. Sovereignty is a concept of
political or public law and property belongs to civil or private law.
' 24
Nevertheless, the experience of common property regimes involving
purely private actors can inform contemporary state practice with respect
to the possible use of condominium by sovereigns to resolve territorial
disputes. While sovereignty and property involve different types of ac-
tors, they also derive from similar theoretical underpinnings. 22 Some
have wondered whether the study of condominium would benefit from a
comparison to common property regimes in domestic law.226 Part III
demonstrates that such a comparison sheds light on the possibilities
available to States that share full sovereign rights over territory (even
disputed territory).
With respect to sovereignty, the transformation of political commu-
nity in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries produced the vocabulary
of the modem territorial State. Loyalties to the sovereign State sup-
planted allegiance to an "immediate feudal superior" and "customary
religious obedience to the Church under the Pope.' '227 For more than three
centuries, the primacy of sovereignty in state behavior remained con-
stant. However, recently, States have been more willing to release their
grip on the primacy of sovereignty in the international arena.
28
223. This Part explicitly considers how lessons from the context of private property and
individuals can be carried over to the world of sovereignty and States. As such, the title of this
Part reflects both homage and reconsideration of the lecture and article of the same title more
than seventy years ago. See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8
(1927).
224. Id. at 8.
225. It is important to remember, after all, that when Cohen gave his lecture in 1927,
sovereignty was considered the defining characteristic of state behavior.
226. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 43, at 79-80.
227. MARTIN WIGHT, POWER POLITICS (1946), reprinted in "LOOKING FORWARD" PAM-
PHLETS, no. 8, at 8 (Royal Institute of International Affairs ed., 1946). Jean Bodin, the late-
sixteenth century French political theorist, is regarded as the father of the concept of sover-
eignty. Bodin argued that sovereign power amounted to coercive power, and such power was
to be wielded at the expense of others. As Bodin explained, sovereign power could not be
shared because if the sovereign "holds of another, he is not sovereign." JEAN BODIN, SIX
BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 36 (M.J. Tooley trans., Basil Blackwell 1955). Bodin's views
were shared by John Adams, who described dual sovereignty as "the height of political ab-
surdity." GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 351 (1972).
228. See Andrew Linklater, Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post- Westphalian State,
reprinted in RE-IMAGINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY: STUDIES IN COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY
113, 113 (Daniele Archibugi, David Held & Martin Kohler eds., 1998) ("As the present cen-
tury draws to a close, the subnational revolt, the internationalization of decision-making, and
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On the other hand, private property is typically defined in lay terms
as the relationship between people and things. 9 Property theorists, by
contrast, recognize that property actually defines the more complex rela-
tionships among people with respect to things. Importantly, both
laypeople and theorists tend to agree that property rights vest people
with at least one fundamental right: the right to exclude.230 Thus, notions
of private property, however defined, start from the premise that indi-
viduals have some form of exclusive control over their property, even if
they can exclude only some-but not all-people.
Like people, States cast their concepts of property in the exclusion-
ary mold: my territorial rights allow me to exclude you while conducting
whatever business I choose. Also, like people, States are constrained by
some restrictions on their activities, particularly when their internal ac-
tions harm others. However, as a baseline, property rights in a territory
vest a State with certain powers, including, at a minimum, the right to
exclude.
Common property regimes regulate the rights of all of the parties to
the property interest in question. Whether in common law or civil law,
these regimes govern the right of owners to use, exclude, and regulate
the ways in which ownership can be exercised, ceded, or abused. Per-
haps then, joint sovereignty arrangements are analogous to common
property regimes.23
Under a condominium, two or more States exercise exclusive control
over a territory. They maintain and exercise their right to exclude others,
much as members of a common property regime may hold exclusionary
rights with respect to non-members, even as they share rights with one
232another. As with any common property regime, the paramount
emergent transnational loyalties in Western Europe reveal that the processes that created and
sustained sovereign states in this region are being reversed."). One example of a common
property regime in the context of joint sovereignty is Antarctica, discussed supra, which is
governed as a global commons. The Antarctic regime establishes the viability of common
property-type solutions for disputes over sovereignty. Note, however, that the Antarctic regime
establishes a global commons, thereby eroding the traditional notions of exclusive control.
Nonetheless, the joint sovereignty arrangement in Antarctica is unique, and, even in the global
commons framework, signatory States possess certain rights to exclude non-signatories. The
Antarctic Treaty has evolved into a system that covers most of the potential activities in Ant-
arctica, where issues of property and of governance are tied together in the absence of other
exogenous factors.
229. See Thomas Gray, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NoMos XXII 69
(J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) (discussing these perspectives).
230. See id. at 59, 81.
231. Indeed, Lassa Oppenheim himself recognized this possibility when he defined a
condominium as a "piece of territory consisting of land or water ... under the joint tenancy of
two or more States, these several States exercising sovereignty conjointly over it, and over the
individuals living thereon." 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, at 453.
232. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 59 (1990).
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concerns for States as actors are over exploitation of resources and free
233riding by partners in the common property. Moreover, the distinction
between property and sovereignty-between the ownership of land and
the right to govern-has become so ingrained in legal discourse that we
often forget that the distinction dissolves in cases in which notions of
land ownership and of government are closely related. M
For relevant lessons in the private property realm, the work of politi-
cal scientist Elinor Ostrom is particularly instructive. Ostrom
investigated a number of common property regimes over what she de-
scribed as common pool resources (CPRs). 35 In conducting her analysis,
Ostrom relied on four long-enduring, self-organized, and self-governed
CPRs. The four cases explored successful common property regimes "in
which (1) appropriators have devised, applied, and monitored their own
rules to control the use of their CPRs and (2) the resource systems, as
well as the institutions, have survived for long periods of time. 236 The
four cases were chosen because they shared several important character-
istics: (1) small populations; (2) similar demands and needs within each
community; and (3) a well-ingrained custom, which had endured for
centuries (and, in at least one case, more than a millennium).237 In addi-
tion, all four CPR settings faced the challenge of "uncertain and complex
environments.""' More importantly, these four regimes offer insight into
successful structures for sharing and indeed cultivating jointly held re-
sources.
Ostrom's inquiry suggests a number of features of common property
regimes that might prove instructive for the analogous relationship in the
233. This is a common argument that dates back to Garrett Hardin's 1968 pioneering
article. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968). Hardin illus-
trates the tragic consequences of the commons by looking at herding on pastures "open to all."
Id. at 1244.
234. See Stuart Banner, The Political Function of the Commons: Changing Conceptions
of Property and Sovereignty in Missouri, 1750-1850, 41 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 61 (1997); see also
I FREDERICK POLLOCK & F.W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 527-28, 586-97
(2d ed. 1968); Francis S. Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L.
REV. 691, 707-10 (1983). See generally Cohen, supra note 223. Indeed, on some occasions,
the commons provides for institutions of self-government when there is a vacuum of power.
235. See OSTROM, supra note 232, at 58.
236. Id. The four regimes Ostrom examined were: (1) a Swiss village (Torbel) with a
common property regime over cow grazing and timber; (2) three Japanese villages (Hirano,
Nagaike, and Yamanoka) with similar common property regimes over grazing and timber; (3)
three towns in Spain (Valencia, Morica/Orihuela, and Alicante) with variations on common
irrigation systems (huertas); and (4) several zanjera irrigation communities in the Philippines.
See id. at 61-88. Ostrom's detailed study of the common property regimes in four small com-
munities provides an additional theoretical construct for crafting condominia to resolve
complex, contemporary disputes.
237. See id. at 88-91.
238. id. at 88.
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international public law sphere. Specifically, Ostrom has identified eight
design principles illustrated by the four long-enduring CPRs.239 These
principles are: (1) clearly defined boundaries; (2) congruence between
the rules for appropriation and local conditions; (3) collective-choice
arrangements; (4) monitoring systems; (5) graduated sanctions; (6) con-
flict-resolution mechanisms; (7) minimal recognition of rights to
organize; and (8) multi-tiered, nested enterprises. 240
The eighth design principle-nested enterprises-merits closer dis-
cussion as a means of understanding how the common property regimes
among small, homogeneous communities described by Ostrom can be-
come a framework for joint sovereignty arrangements among States.
Ostrom finds that "all of the more complex, enduring CPRs ... [organ-
ize] appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict
resolution, and governance activities ... in multiple layers of nested en-
terprises., 24' The CPRs are constructed on levels that may in turn be
242nested in local, regional, and national governmental jurisdictions. For
example, in the case of the Filipino irrigation canals, the problems facing
irrigators at the level of a tertiary canal are different from the problems
facing a larger group sharing a secondary canal. Those, in turn, are dif-
ferent from the problems involved in the management of the main
diversion works that affect the entire system. Establishing rules at one
level, without rules at the other levels, will produce an incomplete sys-
243tem that will not endure over the long run.
Like common property regimes over common pool resources, con-
dominia over shared territory must take account of local conditions,
regulate the behavior of interested actors, and enforce sanctions against
wrongdoers who violate agreements governing the use of the territory.
Unlike the common property regimes, condominia must deal with both
public and private actors (rather than only private actors) and must con-
tend with regulation of not only the shared resources, but also many
other aspects of life in the jointly governed territory. Thus, the lessons to
be drawn from Ostrom's work in the private property context offer a
starting point for the construction of shared sovereignty arrangements.
239. See id. at 90 (outlining the eight principles in a detailed table).
240. Id. at 90.
241. Id. at 101.
242. See id. at 102.
243. Id.
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IV. A FLOOR PLAN OF THE MODEL CONDOMINIUM
This Part describes principles for a model condominium drawn from
Ostrom's work on common pool resources combined with lessons de-
rived from past condominia. As the condominia over the Dutch-Prussian
Frontier Stream and over the Gulf of Fonseca demonstrate, States are
capable of sharing resources just like private actors. Ostrom's common
property regimes offer a set of design principles that can be shaped to
apply to condominium arrangements. In the analogous world of joint
sovereignty among States, the guiding principles allow practitioners to
take a more rigorous approach in developing an arrangement that can
endure the challenges of common property regimes in a state of mistrust
and heightened tension. Meanwhile, the lessons of past experience iden-
tified in Part I of this Article offer specific instructions for elements of
any condominium.
Each of Ostrom's eight factors for common pool resources might
also be considered an indispensable element of any condominium ar-
rangement.2" The basic features that would allow a complex common
property regime to function include clear rules of engagement, princi-
pled bases for those rules, mechanisms for enforcement of those rules,
and respect by citizens of the rules and the consequences of any breach.
The Moresnet condominium highlights the importance of transparency
of lawmaking for condominia. Because residents of condominium terri-
tories often will be skeptical of one-or more-of the condominium
partners, transparent processes-both for the drafting and implementa-
tion of laws-allow skepticism to be overcome by demonstrating
openness and fairness in all aspects of government function and power.
Dating back to the first recorded condominium in the thirteenth century
B.C., the Hittite condominium incorporated rights of supervision by each
partner in the condominium.
As the New Hebrides condominium demonstrated, joint implementa-
tion of governing laws strengthens the incentive to jointly monitor and
enforce those laws. Clear and robust laws also reduce opportunities for
disputes over implementation. If the framers of a condominium under-
stand the underlying common property principles in the territory in
which a condominium is being created and so create rules to harness
those principles, rather than to counteract them, the condominium will
244. To recall, those eight factors include (1) clearly defined boundaries; (2) congruence
between the rules for appropriation and local conditions; (3) collective-choice arrangements;
(4) monitoring systems; (5) graduated sanctions; (6) conflict-resolution mechanisms; (7)
minimal recognition of rights to organize; and (8) multi-tiered, nested enterprises. See id.
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be more likely to succeed in providing a long-term, stable resolution to
the territorial dispute.245
With respect to the governing structure and layers of authority, Tri-
este successfully implemented a system in which more local control
could be exercised at the lower levels. The sovereign powers administer-
ing the territory could protect their rights and interests at the macro level,
while officials selected locally could control the day-to-day functions of
the government. As the Trieste experience demonstrates, however, such
devolution of authority must be carefully monitored so that competing
groups are not placed in positions of dominance over one another. Such
conditions lend themselves to misuse of power and threaten the viability
of the condominium. As the shortcomings of the Trieste condominium
amply expose, a condominium that ignores the multiple layers of its ter-
ritory and society cannot succeed over the long term.
The experiences in Trieste and Sudan also demonstrate that condo-
minium can only succeed where the condominium partners are co-equals
in authority, with equal rights and obligations. To place one party in con-
trol at the expense of the other undermines the legitimacy of the
condominium and threatens its viability as a long-term solution.
The Schleswig-Holstein condominium shows that shared ideology
can be essential. There, the shared ideology of the Austrians and Prus-
sians allowed the partners to overcome some of the hurdles they faced.
Not all condominium partners will share ideology (indeed, the opposite
will often be true), but when they do, the condominium will have a
greater chance of success.
As in common property regimes, in condominia, outside parties-
whether States, international organizations, or non-governmental organi-
zations-must create an incentive structure to ensure that parties
maintain their commitment to the arrangement. If each State is made to
believe that it stands to lose the entire region and that the condominium
is the only guarantee that it will have of control over the disputed terri-
tory, there is a chance that both sides will consider joint sovereignty. For
monitoring purposes, condominium arrangements generally should in-
clude an additional layer of nesting-the supranational level-from
which multilateral or other non-governmental bodies may be called upon
to resolve disputes among the condominium sovereigns. Outside partici-
pation in collective dispute resolution can prove effective, as
demonstrated by models adopted as far back as the Hittite condominium.
245. Of course, one problem with this analysis is that the framers of the condominium
are the negotiating parties, and those parties are more concerned with self-interest and bar-
gaining leverage than they are in accommodating the local population. Otherwise the parties
would simply allow the residents to determine their status by referendum. However, the inter-
ests of the condominium powers themselves are best served by a durable resolution.
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While in some cases the judicial bodies of one of the condominium
partners can provide impartial decision-making (as in the Dutch-Prussian
Frontier Stream), on balance, condominia are most likely to succeed
with a tiered judicial process that includes internal and external voices.
Ideally, condominia will be propelled by some type of an action-
forcing event. Action-forcing events occur when outside actors impose
conditions on negotiating parties that press them to make concessions in
246order to reach a compromise. In the context of negotiations over a pro-
posed condominium, an action-forcing event exists when there is a threat
of action that will be taken if the parties do not (i) appear at the table, (ii)
negotiate in good faith, and (iii) participate in the condominium ar-
rangement as agreed. Moreover, if a viable, neutral third party can be
identified, the two sides might be able to use the condominium as a
building block for more amicable relations on a broader range of issues.
Condominium can be a viable, long-term solution to existing bound-
ary disputes. As past experiences indicate, shared sovereignty can
succeed if such an arrangement is carefully crafted to take account of the
specific features of the territory and people being governed. The frame-
work drawn from long-standing common property regimes over
potentially scarce resources provides the structure that can be used in
crafting the specific solution to an existing boundary dispute. Rather
than carving up a disputed territory by drawing lines, condominium al-
lows States to collaborate and build a community of shared rights and
responsibilities. This, in turn, might offer long-term stability with re-
duced incentives for local residents, the condominium powers, or outside
third parties to exacerbate tensions or to in any other way attempt to re-
draw the boundary lines.
V. CONCLUSION
Boundary disputes have long been sources of tension between States
and a root of war, but they threaten international peace and security more
today than ever before.247 The time has come to return to condominium
246. MICHAEL WATKINS & SUSAN ROSEGRANT, BREAKTHROUGH INTERNATIONAL NE-
GOTIATION: How GREAT NEGOTIATORS TRANSFORMED THE WORLD'S TOUGHEST POST-COLD
WAR CONFLICTS 123 (2001).
247. Nearly a century ago, one of Britain's leading imperialists, Lord Curzon, then a
former Viceroy of India and later the British Foreign Secretary, identified the threat of bound-
ary disputes, describing them as "the razor's edge on which hang suspended the modem issues
of war or peace, of life or death to nations." Lord Curzon of Kedleston, Address at the Ro-
manes Lecture of 1907, http://www-ibru.dur.ac.uk/docs/curzonl.html (last visited Mar. 20,




as a solution to certain intractable boundary disputes. The power of sov-
ereignty as the dominant force in global relations has diminished
substantially. Boundary disputes that involve territories, rather than mere
line drawing, remain at the forefront of some of the world's most
charged conflicts.248 And condominium, so often discarded from the dis-
course on potential solutions, has often been little more than a scapegoat
for failures independent of the difficulties posed by joint sovereignty. In
many cases, the failure of the condominium has resulted from the fact
that it has largely been adopted as a solution when all else has failed. In
other cases, the failed arrangements were not condominia at all, while in
still other cases, failures stemmed from lack of proper planning and fore-
sight to identify critical problems and real, negotiated solutions to those
problems. Nothing in the nature of a condominium preordains its failure
as a device for dispute resolution among States.
Negotiated solutions offer the best hope for enduring resolutions to
boundary disputes. Long-term solutions are virtually impossible to ob-
tain when one side must cede its rights to a territory it views as part of its
own territory. By contrast, a solution that allows all of the parties to the
dispute to maintain their rights would allow for a meaningful settlement
that may prove durable over time.
This Article represents an initial effort to rekindle the flickering
flame of condominium. The next step in the process would be to elabo-
rate on the specifications for a model condominium, where a
condominium could be established not only to resolve an ongoing
boundary dispute, but also to test the mechanisms for successful condo-
minium governance.
Future research could explore the framework for a model condomin-
ium in greater detail, focusing on the experience in the New Hebrides
and proposing a condominium solution to a specific ongoing boundary
You may ransack the catalogues of libraries, you may search the indexes of cele-
brated historical works, you may study the writings of scholars, [yet] you will find
the subject [of frontiers] almost wholly ignored. Its formula are hidden in the ar-
cane of diplomatic chancelleries; its documents are embedded in vast and
forbidding collections of treaties, its incidents and what I may describe as its in-
comparable drama are the possession of a few silent men, who may be found in the
clubs of London, Paris or Berlin, when they are not engaged in tracing lines upon
the unknown frontiers of the earth.
Id.
248. Indeed, the exogenous forces that influence the success or failure of condominia
have changed since the period in which the condominium was widely used as a solution to
boundary disputes. These new forces present new opportunities to turn to condominium for a
durable solution to boundary disputes. Just as the development of nuclear capabilities altered
the nature of the Cold War, so too must the proliferation of nuclear weapons lead us to trans-
form our perspectives on international dispute resolution.
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dispute-for example, the dispute between Russia and Japan over the
Kurile Islands to the north of the Japanese island of Hokkaido.2 49 As in
the common pool resources context, condominia would be most success-
ful over territories with small populations with shared demands and
needs that will unify the population in service to meeting those shared
demands and needs.
At a minimum, the history of condominium arrangements reveals
that supposedly indivisible territorial rights can be reformulated to create
a joint exercise of territorial sovereignty. Recent developments in state
practice suggest that sovereignty can be divided and shared among States
or between States and international organizations.
In spite of the close relationship between the condominium itself and
the territory where it is imposed, condominia have generally been built
from the top down. By establishing the connection between local con-
ceptions of joint or common ownership and the framework for their
governance by joint sovereignty, it may be possible to construct a territo-
rial condominium the same way real estate developers build the better
known form of condominium from the ground up. Taking account of the
local framework would also vest the local residents with greater owner-
ship in the condominium; thus, locals might participate more actively in
the condominium instead of viewing it as a fiction to resolve more pow-
erful States' political and economic pretensions. More importantly, in
past efforts to design a condominium, the negotiating powers have not
taken account of local conceptions of common property. How do the
residents of the territory conceive of shared rights to land or other re-
sources? Does the condominium align with local custom or contravene
it? These are some of the theoretical questions that underpin the more
pressing practical concerns that preoccupy decision-makers who are
charged with creating a condominium.
249. The dispute over the Kurile Islands offers the most promising opportunity to craft a
durable condominium solution. First, a condominium over the Kuriles will resolve the ongo-
ing dispute over the islands in a way that will allow both Russia and Japan to draw the benefits
they have long sought-for Japan, sovereignty over the islands, and, for Russia, a continued
presence and the rights that flow from that presence. The dispute has lasted since World War II
and has been the top bilateral foreign policy issue between the Russian and Japanese govern-
ments since the early 1990s. At the same time, because the Kuriles do not present the obvious
problems of frontier condominia and because the passions and tension involved in the dispute
do not rise to the level of other contemporary boundary disputes, the Kuriles offer an ideal
opportunity to create a model for future condominium development in other, more troubled
regions of the world. Moreover, the experience of Russia and Japan as condominium partners
over Sakhalin Island, directly to the north of the Kurile Islands, suggests a shared willingness
by both States to use condominium as a solution to territorial disputes. See CORET, supra note
31, at 163-65.
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